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 The Confederate States Navy built wooden gunboats throughout the American Civil War.  
Within Civil War literature, more research and detailed analysis of Confederate States Navy 
construction focuses on building of ironclad vessels.  Wooden gunboat construction is largely 
ignored.  This thesis examines wooden gunboat construction in two different areas of the 
Confederacy: northeastern North Carolina in Washington and Elizabeth City, and the Mars Bluff 
Navy Yard in South Carolina.  Before presenting two Confederate wooden gunboat construction 
case studies, a look at Confederate industrial, manufacturing, and transportation infrastructure, 
from the national perspective, brings into focus the logistical limitations station commanders 
faced in northeastern North Carolina and at Mars Bluff more clearly.  Scattered, yet 
interdependent, marine manufacturing and ordnance facilities, connected by a suspect 
transportation network, created a logistical nightmare.  Historical investigation into wooden 
gunboat construction in Washington, Elizabeth City, and Mars Bluff, examines an overlooked 
Confederate States Navy building program.   
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 Chapter 1: Limited Historical Evaluation 
Considering the amount of scholarship on the American Civil War, one area remains 
neglected.  The number of studies directed toward the Confederate States Navy pales in 
comparison to literature about the armies.  The perception that little documentary evidence 
concerning the Confederate States Navy and its activities survived the war helps suppress 
widespread research into an important aspect of the American Civil War.   
 Within the Confederate States Navy’s limited historiography, scholars focus much of 
their attention on development of ironclads and underwater technology; operations of 
Confederate privateers, commerce raiders, and blockade runners are also more visible.  
Confederate wooden gunboat construction remains shrouded by uncertainty and limited study.  
While it is true naval authorities, led by Confederate Navy Secretary Stephen Mallory, preferred 
newer technologies to combat superior Union naval power, wooden gunboats continued as part 
of Confederate naval strategy throughout the Civil War.  The problem is that wooden gunboat 
construction after 1862 lagged well behind ironclads and, therefore, has produced marginal 
research interest. 
During the past 150 years, historians slowly began peeling away the layers surrounding 
Confederate ironclad construction.  William N. Still’s Iron Afloat, published in 1971, helped 
pave the way for more detailed studies devoted to Southern ironclad policy.  He felt too many 
historians labeled Confederate States Navy ironclad construction as a failure for never 
overcoming the Union blockade.  Rejecting this notion, Still argued that Confederate naval 
policy necessarily shifted to a defensive strategy based upon design and practicality.1  His work 
provided the framework for more detailed evaluations of Southern naval stations and building 
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efforts.   Years later, Robert G. Elliott’s Ironclad on the Roanoke: Gilbert Elliott’s Albemarle, in 
1994, and Confederate Phoenix: the CSS Virginia by Thomas Campbell and Alan B. Flanders, in 
2001, shed light upon those specific ironclad vessels.  The latter two studies detail construction, 
strategy, and operation of those specific ironclads.2  Still’s study, which included chapters on 
ironclad construction and those two vessels, helped spark more detailed analysis of two 
Confederate ironclads built during different phases of Confederate States Navy strategy. 
Coupled with ironclads, Confederate underwater technological development fit into the 
overall Civil War historical narratives as innovations of the modern naval age.  The CSS Hunley, 
lost during its final combat mission, captivated and intrigued historians.  Likewise, the torpedo 
boat CSS David caused similar excitement.  Robert S. Solomon’s The CSS David: The Story of 
the First Successful Torpedo Boat, in 1970, and The H. L. Hunley, The Secret Hope of the 
Confederacy, by Tom Chaffin, in 2008, represent two studies of the more exotic rebel naval 
activities.3   The Confederate States Navy’s narrative is also bolstered by studies and research 
centered around the exploits of Admiral Raphael Semmes and other commerce raiders.4  Many 
studies represent more romanticized topics associated with the Confederacy. 
In addition to topically driven studies, in recent decades more comprehensive histories 
have been published attempting to tell the entire story of the Confederate States Navy, 
incorporating construction efforts, combat operations, and aspects of diplomacy.  Raimondo 
Luraghi’s A History of the Confederate Navy, in 1996, and Tucker Spencer’s Blue and Gray 
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Navies, in 2006, each offer complete overviews of Confederate naval history.5  Although 
Tucker’s study includes Union naval history, it focuses upon the Confederate States Navy in a 
complete way.  He centered his overview on technological innovations developed by each side.6  
Despite each study’s inclusive nature, little time is spent on wooden gunboat construction and its 
associated logistical activities.   
Research devoted to strictly wooden gunboat construction and related logistics remains 
limited.  The few historians that researched wooden gunboats and the efforts to build them are 
scattered within the technologically driven Confederate historiography.  Some recent research 
has generally been broad, incorporating the entire Civil War naval story. Other studies that 
attempted to narrow their focus into regional perspectives remained within a technologically 
driven historiographical thread.  
 Only four studies specifically devote serious time and research to wooden gunboat 
construction.  All four studies are questionable if considering a specific historiographical path; 
however, all four distance themselves from the usual Confederate naval perspective.   These 
histories are scattered over a 110 year period beginning in 1887 and ending in 1996.  While 
many decades separate them, each adds significantly to a neglected area of Civil War history. 
 Thomas Scharf, a former Confederate Midshipmen, published History of the Confederate 
States Navy in 1887.  His comprehensive study looked at the Confederate States Navy as a 
whole.7  Instead of merely putting a memoir together, Scharf attempted to present the entire 
Southern navy story.  From the beginning, the author argued that the Union won the war based 
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upon its superior naval strength and that its armies were consistently outclassed and outfought 
for four years.  The discrepancy between Union North versus Confederate South’s naval strength 
compelled Scharf to write a history explaining the Confederate States Navy’s overlooked, and 
outmatched, contributions to “the cause.”   
 Scharf’s study was comprehensive and generally praiseworthy.  He detailed each 
geographic region within the Confederacy, recounting naval activities in each.  He described 
blockade running operations, commerce raiding, and naval technological innovations. Of special 
significance to Scharf were the joint military operations of the Union army and navy, arguing 
that their combined strength was too much for the Confederacy to handle.  As a former 
Confederate naval officer, Scharf did not conceal his generally praiseworthy opinion of his 
former employer and brothers in arms.  He felt that, in spite of the economic and industrial 
disparities, Confederate naval officials did more with less, especially in the pursuit of new 
technology.  The author’s emotional attachment clouded an objective view of the Confederate 
States Navy.  Regardless of the study’s tone, Scharf began a Civil War historiographical thread.  
Though offering little detail in ship construction, the author’s overview attempted to present a 
complete record of events, operations, and construction efforts of the Confederate States Navy.    
 Decades passed before William N. Still published Confederate Shipbuilding in 1969.  
Still’s study did not focus on combat operations of the rebel navy, but rather he analyzed 
systemic influences affecting Confederate warship production, focusing on three areas: facilities, 
material, and labor.8  Through vigorous research, Still successfully argued Confederate 
competence in constructing warships.  Though not a comprehensive study as neither combat 
operation nor Confederate activities overseas are included, Still’s research provided groundwork 
for more research and effectively splintered the historiography of the Confederate States Navy.  
                                                 
8
 William N. Still, Confederate Shipbuilding (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1969, 23, 47, 61. 
  
5 
 
It was splintered because he did not specifically focus on one shipbuilding program over another.  
Despite more documentary evidence favoring ironclad production, Still laid the foundation for 
comprehensive shipbuilding research, regardless of which program might be investigated.   
 In 1988, Maxine Turner’s Navy Gray: A Story of the Confederate Navy on the 
Chattahoochee River represented the next step in an embryonic historiographical thread.  Turner 
focused her attention upon a forgotten and overlooked area within Civil War research.9  
Emphasizing Confederate naval activities in the Apalachicola River system, Turner offered a 
substantive look at a forgotten area of Confederate naval history.  The author detailed all aspects 
of life, meticulously describing the area’s historical development economically, socially, and 
politically.   Successful description enabled Turner to articulate the river system’s place within 
the overall structure of Confederate naval operations. 
 The genius behind Turner’s study is its originality.  The author purposely devoted 
primary research to an overlooked area.  Focus on regional Confederate naval activities included 
a substantive look at the construction and repair of the CSS Chattahoochee, a wooden gunboat.  
Since Scharf’s study opened the door and Still’s laid the foundation, Turner’s look at the 
Confederate States Navy in interior Alabama and Georgia offered promise for more wooden 
gunboat research.  
 John M. Coski’s Capital Navy, in 1996, followed a framework similar to Turner’s.  Coski 
offered a complete overview of the James River Squadron including combat and construction.10  
Coski’s emphasis inevitably covered ironclad construction, as four were built in and around 
Richmond; but he detailed local operations offering insights into all construction, including 
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wooden gunboats.  Coski’s organization mirrored Turner’s look at the Chattahoochee River.  It 
might be a stretch to include Capital Navy in this historiographical evolution, but the similarities 
in structure to Turner’s study and the complete nature of Coski’s depiction of Confederate naval 
construction made it a useful research aid.    
 Even with recent strides in Confederate wooden gunboat research, other regions involved 
remain neglected.  Two areas, eastern North Carolina during the first year of the war and 
northeastern South Carolina on the Great Pee Dee River during the Confederate Navy’s 
reorganization through the end of the war, have been ignored. Upon closer examination, 
logistical limitations faced in these two areas mirror other, more studied, commands.  Problems 
faced by commanders and shipbuilders constructing ironclads were similar to those faced by 
wooden shipbuilders, despite material and design differences. 
 This thesis will first present a brief overview of the establishment of the Confederate 
States Navy.  Following that initial overview, two separate building programs will be covered: 
the ironclad program and the wooden program.  Between the two programs, shipbuilding 
facilities and industrial capabilities of the Confederacy will be addressed.  By presenting the two 
programs simultaneously, logistical problems experienced by both programs will be brought into 
focus.   After describing the Confederate States Navy’s wooden gunboat program, two case 
studies will be detailed.  One chapter will focus on the CSS Peedee; the other will center on 
wooden gunboat construction in eastern North Carolina during the war’s first year.  These 
chapters will demonstrate the logistical problems faced by shipbuilders at the local level.  
Through presentation of Confederate wooden gunboat construction at both national and local 
levels, it will be shown that the wooden gunboat program’s logistical problems mirrored those of 
ironclad production.    
 Chapter 2: Establishing a Navy Department 
Establishment of the Confederate States Navy occurred amid confusion and uncertainty.  
Seven states seceded from the Union during the three month period from December 1860 
through February 1861.  Those seven states; South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, began their transformation from members of the United States 
into pieces of what they hoped would become a new independent, internationally recognized 
country.11   On February 8, 1861, southern leaders and delegates from those states met and 
agreed upon a provisional government of the Confederate States of America.12 
 With the Confederate government formed on paper, leaders charged with its direction 
began establishing a functional government.  Institutions and areas of governance started to take 
shape and the Confederacy began readying itself for any potential hostility the United States 
might unleash.  The possibility of armed conflict was real and Confederate authorities began 
forming a national military force.  The provisional government formed a committee to take care 
of naval affairs on February 14, 1861.  Resolution number fourteen, as it was listed, suggested all 
men familiar with naval affairs be included in its creation; this proclamation was the first official 
reference to a Southern navy.  A week later, on February 21, 1861, the Provisional Confederate 
Congress created the Confederate States Navy, officially including the department within the 
executive branch.13   
 To lead the Confederate government, delegates in Montgomery elected Jefferson Davis 
as the first President.  Davis filled available cabinet positions quickly.  For Navy Secretary, the 
President chose Florida’s Stephen R. Mallory, a former United States Senator with experience in 
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naval affairs.  While serving in Congress, Senator Mallory sat on the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee and studied the configuration and organization of many of the world’s contemporary 
navies.  Some southerners opposed the president’s appointment as Mallory received lukewarm 
support from the Committee of Naval Affairs.  Despite the opposition, Mallory filled the position 
with confidence and energy, though having little executive experience.14   
Confederate States Navy Department 
From the beginning, the naval department was placed in a subservient position to the 
Confederate War Department within Davis’s administration.  Faced with a significant frontier, 
President Davis, a former army officer and United States Secretary of War, placed greater 
emphasis on land based military capabilities and defense.  The President thought of the navy 
sparingly as politics and public opinion focused his energies elsewhere, chiefly on the 
Confederate Army.  Unlike the War Department, Secretary Mallory and the Confederate Navy 
Department were left largely unmolested by presidential intrusion and micromanagement.  
Mallory had considerable freedom in developing the new Southern Navy, but received little help 
or encouragement from other departments preoccupied by prospects of land invasions from the 
north.15 
Mallory faced a tremendous challenge building a modern navy from scratch.  The 
secretary had no working navy, not even a staff to whom he could delegate responsibility.  He 
submitted a report to the Provisional Confederate Congress outlining the command structure and 
organization of a navy that included four Captains, four Commanders, thirty Lieutenants, five 
Surgeons, five Assistant Surgeons, six Paymasters, and two Chief Engineers.  Within this report, 
the secretary asked for a total of $2,065,110 for the navy’s first fiscal year ending February 1862.  
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The money provided salaries, funds for repair to the Pensacola Navy Yard, and the purchase or 
construction of ten steam gunboats.16    
A few days after Mallory’s first report, the Confederate Congress made accommodations 
for a working navy department.  With the act, published March 16, 1861, legislators created the 
organizational framework all officers and personnel would follow.  The offices of Orders and 
Detail, Ordnance and Hydrography, Medical Supply, and Clothing and Provisions were created 
to complete the administrative structure.  Six companies of marines were authorized.  Rank and 
pay, as well as rules regarding leave, resignation, and retirement for all commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers were outlined.17   
The four main offices within the navy department, along with the Marine Corps, 
functioned much like the United States Navy.  Although following a similar organizational 
framework, the navy department compressed several separate offices found in the United States 
Navy into one of the four established by the first Confederate legislative acts.  Unlike the United 
States Navy, the Confederate States Navy had no independent offices for construction, 
maintenance, or engineering.  This organizational deficiency extended to shore installations.  
Aspects of repair and construction as well as the navy yards where maintenance took place were 
assigned to the Office of Ordnance and Hydrography.  Matters of equipping vessels, including 
the acquisition of coal, went through the Office of Orders and Detail.  Mallory helped streamline 
this organizational deficiency in 1863 by creating the positions of Chief Naval Constructor and 
Engineer in Chief who reported directly to him.18  
                                                 
16
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Despite being quite small in comparison to the War Department, the Confederate States 
Navy had no shortage of capable men seeking leadership positions.  Mallory appointed Lawrence 
Rousseau, Josiah Tattnall, Victor M. Randolph, and Duncan N. Ingraham as the first Confederate 
Navy Captains.  For the rank of Commander, the secretary extended commissions to Ebenezer 
Farrand, Thomas W. Brent, Raphael Semmes, and Henry J. Hartstene.  Those eight men 
constituted the first senior Confederate naval officers, but they had no navy to command.19  
While waiting for ships and fleets to be constructed and equipped, some staffed command 
positions in the different bureaus during the department’s first months.  Of those eight senior 
officers, Captain Lawrence Rousseau briefly commanded the Office of Orders and Detail in 
August 1861.20  Captain Duncan N. Ingraham commanded the Office of Ordnance and 
Hydrography until November 1861.21   
Although having administrative freedom and a familiar organizational structure, Mallory 
faced a multifaceted problem organizing the Confederate States Navy.  The only navy he 
possessed existed on paper.  Quickly turning laws and proclamations into a functioning navy 
department proved difficult.  Considering the proximity of the enemy, the length of the 
Confederate coastline, and the lack of an industrial base, Mallory needed to assess and 
implement naval directives quickly, before hostilities between the Confederacy and United States 
began.  Unfortunately for Mallory, the prospects of an extended peace, enabling implementation 
of a comprehensive plan to produce a navy, evaporated April 12, 1861. 
That evening, in Charleston, South Carolina, hostilities commenced between the 
Confederacy and United States.  Under orders from General P. G. T. Beauregard, Southern 
forces opened fire on Fort Sumter.  In response to this overt act of aggression, President 
                                                 
19
 Raimondo Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 15.   
20
 Wells, The Confederate Navy, 13. 
21
 Ibid., 46.  
  
11 
 
Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 troops from all states to quell 
hostilities.22   In response, southern states still debating the question of secession made their 
choice.  Four states, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, affirmed their support 
of the Confederacy, seceding within weeks of President Lincoln’s proclamation.  Despite the 
welcome addition of those states, especially Virginia, Secretary Mallory had to establish a navy 
with a war raging around him.   
Assembling a Navy: State Navies, Confiscation, and Purchase  
 With a departmental framework and new officers, Mallory set out to obtain ships.  Three 
options existed for the navy secretary.  First, he could confiscate, purchase, and fit out vessels in 
Confederate waters.  Second, purchasing and building ships overseas in European yards seemed 
attractive, and could possibly cement alliances with established maritime powers.  Third, 
Mallory could implement a domestic shipbuilding program at yards throughout the South.  With 
naval technologies quickly evolving during the mid-nineteenth century, Mallory could go in two 
directions with the third option, a wooden or iron plated fleet.  All three options were put to use 
by Mallory’s department. 
 The confiscation and purchase of existing vessels occurred almost immediately.  Even 
before the Confederate government was formed, seceding state governments acted.  After 
passing the Ordinance of Secession, leaders in Charleston mobilized state defenses, including a 
small naval force.  Governor Francis Pickens acted quickly to quell fears of an amphibious 
invasion.  The South Carolina legislature provided funds for coastal defense forces.  The South 
Carolina Navy consisted of two small vessels that patrolled Charleston Harbor.  Later, in early 
January 1861, state leaders appropriated funds for the construction of “three propeller driven 
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ships” for $150,000.  These ships would help guard Charleston, Beaufort, and Georgetown from 
invasion.23 
 Throughout the South, as states left the Union, state legislatures and governors acted to 
provide for defense of their state borders.  Different southern states approached naval defense 
with varying degrees of urgency.  Georgia followed a path similar to South Carolina, forming a 
state navy consisting of two purchased steamers.  In addition to purchasing vessels to convert 
into warships, Georgia appropriated money to build three new ships.24   
Unlike actions taken by South Carolina and Georgia leaders to protect important ports, 
Mississippi’s state leaders charted a different course.  Preoccupied with an expansive river 
frontier, state leaders in Jackson favored land based shore installations with heavy artillery.  A 
small coastline bordering the Gulf of Mexico mattered little, as the western border took 
precedent.  Bolstering the Mississippi River’s protection, Louisiana seized forts at the river’s 
entrance and secured two revenue cutters. During February 1861, state run naval forces were 
absorbed into the Confederate States Navy.25  Upon his appointment, Secretary Mallory acquired 
a small navy consisting of ten ships mounting fifteen guns.26   
Mallory accepted the few vessels state governments mustered.  Any ship able to float and 
carry armament was welcomed.  As the Confederacy’s borders broadened through mid-1861, the 
state navies of Virginia and North Carolina sold seven vessels to the Confederate Navy for 
coastal defense. In addition to absorbing state navies, the Confederate Navy converted eight 
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more ships for naval service, including the CSS Sumter and CSS McRae.27 Understanding that 
construction efforts at both public and private yards would take time to set in motion, Mallory 
instituted a second purchasing initiative overseas.    
Great Britain, and its shipyards, was the destination of officials charged with making 
purchases on behalf of the Confederate States Navy.  Mallory chose Georgia’s James D. Bulloch 
as the first Confederate naval agent serving abroad.28  Having extensive service in the United 
States Navy and knowledge of the Mississippi River system, Bulloch was surprised by his 
assignment.  He stated: 
Remembering the discussions on the subject at New Orleans, I got the impression, when 
summoned to Montgomery, that I was wanted about the Mississippi River defenses, and 
the Secretary of the Navy’s laconic query, when I could start for Europe, rather surprised 
me.  There was, however, no time for parley…The South was outnumbered in population 
at least five to one.  In military and naval resources the disproportion was many times 
greater…Mr. Mallory briefly touched upon the condition of his department…A 
committee of naval officers were examining the few vessels at the different Southern 
ports, but up to that date had found only the one in Semmes had in hand which could be 
converted into a ship-of-war.29 
 
Mallory instructed Bulloch to purchase as many as six steam propellers overseas.  If purchasing 
was not an option, he was to begin the process of constructing Confederate vessels in foreign 
yards.  Building vessels was less desirable because constructing them could tangle political and 
diplomatic waters.  With the bombardment of Fort Sumter weeks before, vessels were needed 
quickly.  Confederate agents overseas acted cautiously, under constant surveillance by United 
States agents and diplomats.  In addition to procuring ships, Bulloch arranged to purchase 
clothing, artillery, ammunition, and small arms for sailors and marines.30 
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 Great Britain was not the only European country Mallory wished to buy or construct 
naval vessels in.  The secretary also sent Lt. James H. North to France.  The French, much like 
the British, had tremendous shipbuilding capabilities.  In addition, the French Navy, years 
earlier, began their navy’s transformation into an iron plated fleet.  Lt. North’s objective was to 
purchase a ship similar to the Glorie.31   If not feasible, his objective mirrored Bulloch’s, 
establish an arrangement for constructing vessels for immediate Confederate use.32 
 The purpose of securing vessels overseas was to attack the United States’ commerce and 
merchant shipping.  With a navy still in its infancy, Mallory needed scarce maritime military 
resources available to protect Southern ports from the United States Navy.  Lacking sufficient 
ships, Mallory wished to use a few purchased cruisers to attack northern shipping, diverting 
Union vessels and supplies. While chasing Confederate commerce raiders, establishing an 
effective blockade would take more time.   In addition, amphibious assaults from the Atlantic 
might be disrupted.  The diversionary tactic would give Mallory and the Confederate States 
Navy time to import more war materials from overseas and simultaneously ship large cotton 
stores to foreign markets, keeping the Confederacy financially stable.  Impeding Union 
blockading operations also meant more time implementing a domestic shipbuilding program.33   
Ironclad vs. Wooden Gunboats  
 Organizing a shipbuilding program within the Confederacy’s borders was a daunting 
task.  The South lacked the industrial and manufacturing capacity the Union possessed.  With an 
economy based upon agriculture, the infrastructure for widespread shipbuilding was not 
available.  Mallory had intimate knowledge of the operational capabilities of the current United 
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States Navy as well as its capacity for quick expansion.  In addition to his knowledge of the 
United States Navy, Mallory had studied other navies of the world and knew the impact 
technology had on design and direction of building programs.34  Steam engines, armor plating, 
and changes in ordnance were on the cusp of transforming the projection of naval power.  
Perhaps technological change in ship design was the wildcard Mallory and his small navy 
department could play in combating the number, economic, and industrial superiority the United 
States Navy possessed.   
 The Confederate States Navy’s ship building program went in two directions.  One path 
advocated ironclad warships, the other wanted wooden vessels.  Many influential naval officers 
with prior service in the United States Navy contributed to the two programs.  John M. Brooke, 
William Williamson, Catesby ap. R. Jones, John L. Porter, and Matthew Fontaine Maury were 
instrumental in implementing the building programs.  Both vessel types, ironclad and wooden, 
were constructed and used by the Confederate States Navy.  During the war’s first year, 
advocates on both sides argued the strengths and weaknesses of their construction initiatives.  To 
build a fleet, historian William Still described a three tiered approach: contract with private 
shipyards, construct directly in government controlled yards, and finally, send government 
agents to supervise building efforts at yards.35 
Ironclads  
Ultimately, the decision regarding the allocation of resources to either program rested 
with Secretary Mallory.  Technological innovation won the day and, from the beginning, 
ironclad warships were his department’s priority.  He described his intentions to Confederate 
Naval Affairs Committee Chairman C. M. Conrad.  He stated: 
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I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity.  Such a 
vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all 
blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire Navy…But 
inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability; and thus not only does 
economy but naval success dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron 
against wood, without regard to first cost.  Naval engagements between wooden frigates, 
as they are now built and armed, will prove to be the forlorn hopes of the sea, simply 
contests in which the question, not of victory, but of who shall go to the bottom first.36 
 
Seeing the numerical superiority of the United States Navy in comparison with his makeshift 
fleet of coastal defenders, Mallory proposed combating those numbers with superior ship design.   
 The ironclad program gained momentum after Virginia entered the Confederacy.  Having 
expressed his preference for ironclads, Mallory saw the Commonwealth as an avenue for 
completing “a class of vessels…unknown to naval service.”37  Richmond and Norfolk provided 
the infrastructure needed for ironclad construction.  Norfolk possessed the South’s premier 
shipbuilding facility and Richmond its largest ironworks.   
 After Virginia’s inclusion in the Confederacy, President Davis moved the Confederate 
government to Richmond.  Soon thereafter, Secretary Mallory and three men-John M. Brooke, 
John L. Porter, and William Williamson-devised plans for the South’s first ironclad.  They 
agreed to use a partially burned steam frigate, the USS Merrimack, as the basis for their efforts.  
The steam frigate’s engines were the deciding point.  It would prove difficult and costly to build 
suitable engines.  The time it would take producing those engines domestically or abroad was not 
available.  Porter took care of ship construction, Williamson ran the engineering aspects, and 
Brooke looked after the iron plating.38  The conversion of the USS Merrimack into the CSS 
Virginia took many months before completing the ship in March 1862.   
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 As Confederate ironclad construction began in Norfolk during July 1861, the possibility 
of expanding the program increased.  At first, large scale ironclad production seemed far fetched 
if based on preliminary reports from Captain Duncan N. Ingraham.  Mallory had sent Ingraham 
throughout the Confederacy in search of suitable facilities for rolling two-inch plating for 
armored vessels.  Ingraham reported that facilities located in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Atlanta 
needed time to adjust their machinery to produce two-inch plate.39  Although not able to help 
construction efforts immediately, Mallory hoped the transition could be made in the coming 
months to help expand ironclad construction.   
 As 1861 rolled along, ironclad construction expanded into the western half of the 
Confederacy.  Recognizing the vulnerable position of the Mississippi River, local leaders in 
Mississippi and Louisiana ordered vessels to defend the river’s length.40  Arrangements were 
made to build more ironclad warships in Memphis and New Orleans.  By February 1862, two 
ironclads were under construction in Memphis.  At the other end of the Mississippi River in New 
Orleans, more ironclads were under construction with the CSS Louisiana almost complete.41  In 
all, a total of five western ironclad vessels were under construction by February 1862.  Vessels 
built on the Mississippi River were intended to serve double duty, repel an invasion and also 
fight at sea.   
 Initially, the ironclads constructed in Norfolk and on the Mississippi River were larger 
ships because it was hoped that, after breaking the blockade, they would operate on the open sea, 
possibly menacing northern ports.42  As the war changed over time, construction and design 
changed to suit a defensive strategy focusing on protecting harbors.  The battle of Hampton 
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Roads, Virginia, solidified the ironclad’s standing as the ship of the future, but the Confederacy 
no longer possessed a monopoly on ironclads.  The USS Monitor and other Monitor-Class 
ironclads ended any hopes for a Confederate advantage in naval technology.  Confederate 
ironclads continued to be built, but were designed for shallow water and defensive operations in 
harbors and rivers. 
Wooden Gunboats  
 Even though Mallory preferred an ironclad fleet, he recognized the need for wooden 
vessels. Many officers preferred wooden vessels over ironclads.  Considering the inadequate 
condition of industry and manufacturing facilities, some officers felt the safest, cheapest, and 
fastest route to a fleet rested with wooden ships.  Indeed, the first ships in the Confederate States 
Navy, those absorbed from state navies, were wood.  The wooden program consisted of three 
main ship classifications.  In total, more than 115 wooden vessels were constructed or 
attempted.43  
 The first group of wooden vessels were ordered and contracted during that first summer 
of the war.  As plans were made for ironclads in Virginia and on the Mississippi River, Mallory 
arranged for wooden ships in New Orleans and Mobile to bolster Gulf coast defenses.  Designed 
with both side-wheels and sails, these ships were less than two-hundred feet long.  These ships 
carried up to ten large guns each.44  
 The next class of wooden vessels was designed by John L. Porter.  After Porter entered 
the Confederate States Navy in May 1861, he served in Virginia, at Norfolk’s Gosport Navy 
Yard.  In 1863, he became Chief Constructor of the Confederate Navy and served in that 
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capacity until the war’s end.45  Porter was initially involved with conversion of the USS 
Merrimack into the ironclad CSS Virginia.  Along with his involvement in that project, Porter 
expanded his duties into other projects.  He proposed building large wooden gunboats, divided 
into three classes during the fall of 1861.  The first class was to be 110 ft. long, the second 130 ft. 
long, and the largest class 150 ft. long.  Tying these three classes together was a ten foot hold, 
length, and similar propulsion systems harnessing steam and sail power.46 
 These gunboats were contracted for and built in different shipyards in the Confederacy.  
The smallest type was built near Pensacola, Florida, but destroyed in March 1862.  Two ships of 
the second classification were contracted near Columbus, Georgia, and Elizabeth City, North 
Carolina.  Only the CSS Chattahoochee was completed by January 1863. Seven were contracted 
but only two were completed.47   
 The last group of wooden vessels was conceived by Matthew Fontaine Maury.  Maury 
was a veteran of the United States Navy and renowned for his scientific study and charting of the 
world’s oceans.48  While Maury saw the potential of ironclad warships, he felt the Confederacy’s 
best chance at constructing a fleet rested with wooden vessels.  He felt that defending home 
waters, including rivers and sounds, should be the Confederate States Navy’s first priority.  He 
wrote a detailed overview of his plan to construct small wooden vessels for shallow water 
operations in October 1861.49 
 Maury’s plan was simple.  The craft would be 112 feet in length with a 21 foot beam and 
draw no more than six feet. These small crafts would protrude no more than two feet about the 
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water. Despite being wooden, Maury wanted each craft armed with the newest weaponry.  Rifled 
guns would be mounted on pivots for either side of the craft.  The Maury craft would be 
propelled by a small steam engine rather than sail.  No cabin or superstructure would be erected 
on the main deck.  Those serving would take only enough provisions for a few days time.50 
 The proposed design had many qualities Confederate authorities needed to consider.  To 
Maury, a smaller craft able to operate in shallow waters offered the best chance for domestically 
built ships to combat a naval blockade.  A shallow draft meant larger Union vessels would have 
trouble navigating shallow sounds and river systems to combat smaller vessels.  Rifled guns 
meant greater accuracy from a longer distance.  Knowing that many Union vessels mounted 
smoothbores, Maury sought to exploit this use of less accurate weapons before the United States 
Navy could counter with improved weaponry.  A smaller craft with more accurate guns could 
combat larger, less maneuverable vessels with less accurate weapons, at a longer distance.  
Economically, smaller wooden vessels made more sense because they could be built quickly and 
much cheaper than their iron plated counterparts.51 
 Maury’s gunboat proposal received support from some Confederate authorities.  
Virginia’s Governor Letcher was one of the first to listen to Maury’s plan.  Later, other 
Confederate leaders warmed to the idea of a Jeffersonian fleet of vessels.52  Initially planned for 
use in Virginia’s rivers and the Chesapeake Bay, Maury’s plan was expanded for use throughout 
the Confederacy.  Before Maury’s proposal was official, Mallory apparently authorized 
construction of two medium sized gunboats in Norfolk.  The gunboats, CSS Hampton and CSS 
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Nansemond, were built to similar specifications and eventually operated on the James River.53  In 
December 1861, the Confederate Congress authorized construction of 100 Maury gunboats with 
$2,000,000 appropriated.54  Since ironclads were still unproven, the wooden gunboat project was 
the most ambitious construction initiative proposed by Confederate naval authorities.   
 In the spring of 1862, the CSS Virginia and USS Monitor brought Maury’s wooden 
gunboat program to a screeching halt.  Ironclads would be emphasized by Confederate 
construction efforts.  Their design was modified for service in shallower waters.  Emphasizing 
ironclad production did not spell the end of wooden gunboat production.  From March 1862 
through the end of the war, more wooden vessels were completed and launched; however, they 
were a secondary building program. 
Problems with Construction 
 As ships from both programs continued to be built, similar problems arose concerning 
their construction.  Despite some material differences, each program experienced similar 
logistical problems throughout the war.  Each program was dependent upon the same small labor 
force, inadequate rail system, limited industrial base, and the larger, more politically important 
War Department.  Worse, Union advances in early to mid-1862 stagnated progress made in 
establishing necessary shipbuilding infrastructure.  As the war unfolded, creating makeshift 
facilities only to see Union military advances disrupt progress exacerbated an already strained 
logistical nightmare.   
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 Chapter 3: Inadequate Infrastructure  
In the decades preceding the Civil War, the economies of the southern and northern 
United States took diverging paths.  The North expanded its manufacturing, industrial, and 
distribution capabilities during the first half of the nineteenth century.  The South placed its 
economic fortunes on an agriculturally based society with less diversification.  Driving this lack 
of diversification was the plantation system fueled by slave labor and focusing on a few 
profitable crops, especially cotton.  These crops were shipped north and overseas for 
manufacture into usable products for sale in domestic and foreign markets.  Both the North and 
South amassed considerable wealth through this system, each region reinforcing the other 
economically.55  
In the South, an interdependent network of production and distribution between regions 
hurt internal infrastructure.  Shortsightedness of southern leaders confronted with enormous 
agricultural profit put Southern economic interests into Northern hands.  The few products 
produced in southern cities were largely dependent upon merchant shipping based in northern 
ports such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.   Southern leaders inadvertently outsourced 
important industrial, manufacturing, and distribution capabilities critical for wartime military 
production.56   These inadequacies hurt Secretary Mallory’s efforts in naval construction. 
This was the reality Confederate officials faced in the development of naval forces.  A 
non-industrial, agriculturally based economy created numerous logistical challenges.  President 
Davis said it best while addressing a Joint Session of the Confederate Congress in February 
1862:   
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The people of the Confederate States, being principally engaged in agricultural pursuits, 
were [not] provided at the commencement of hostilities with ships, ship-yards, materials 
for shipbuilding, or skilled mechanics and seamen in sufficient numbers to make the 
prompt creation of a navy a practical task, even if the required appropriations had been 
made for the purpose.57   
 
As a result, both programs, ironclad and wooden, faced similar problems launching vessels to 
face the Union Navy.   
Despite design differences, each program relied on a small population base with limited 
industrial economic infrastructure.  Establishing necessary facilities and maintaining those 
stations’ operations was difficult to orchestrate. Each specific aspect of the Confederate 
shipbuilding complex faced the challenge of operating heavy industrial and manufacturing 
activities within a marginally developed economic environment.  Complicating things further 
was an underdeveloped transportation network overwhelmed by wartime conditions.   
Smaller Population and Limited Urbanization 
After the southern states formed the Confederacy, economic and industrial discrepancies 
between the two belligerents were staggering.  First, population differences made a prolonged 
war favor the Union.  Union states had a total population of more than twenty-two million people 
while the Confederate States had a little more than nine million.  Second, driving that population 
discrepancy further were three and a half million slaves within the rebellious states’ total 
population.  Slavery strained the skilled workforce available to fight and work in wartime 
industry.58  It was not that slaves themselves lacked certain skills, as many of them were artisans 
and contributed labor to Confederate efforts, but the financial lifeline of the Confederacy rested 
on exporting cotton.  Slaves maintained the plantations and continued large scale crop 
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production.  To stop agricultural production meant financial ruin.  Financial ruin meant no 
importation or production of war materials. 
The smaller population base contributed to the Confederacy having fewer cities than the 
North.  With fewer large southern cities, less industrial and manufacturing development took 
place.  Of the ten largest cities in the United States, the Confederacy contained only New 
Orleans, with a population of 168,675.  The next two largest cities in the Confederacy were 
Charleston, South Carolina, and Richmond, Virginia, with populations near 40,000.59  
Production and manufacture of goods in the South paled in comparison to the Union. The 
Confederacy produced some 10 percent of the total manufactured products within the United 
States.60   Fewer urban centers meant a smaller industrial base to mobilize for naval ship 
construction.   
Iron production in the Confederacy was limited and closely associated with the smaller 
industrial and manufacturing base.  The South contained some small rolling and foundry mills 
that produced bar, sheet, and rail iron.  Only eleven such facilities were of any consequence: five 
in Virginia, three in South Carolina, one in Georgia, and two in Tennessee.61  Virginia was the 
most important of these iron producing Confederate states.  In comparison to Pennsylvania, the 
nation’s leading producer of iron products at $15,000,000, Virginia’s $1,500,000 output is quite 
small.62  Despite its paltry production compared to its northern neighbors, Virginia’s inclusion in 
the Confederacy substantially increased Confederate industrial and manufacturing capabilities.  
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Less urbanization, industrial, and manufacturing capabilities contributed to a less 
concentrated citizenry.  An agriculturally dominated society led to a smaller population; 
however, Secretary Mallory faced another problem.  The War Department continuously 
shortchanged the Navy Department’s search for skilled labor to assist needed warship 
construction.  Either through conscription or civilian service to the army, Mallory encountered 
labor shortages at manufacturing and ship construction facilities.  Correspondence between the 
war and naval departments suggested that everything was being done to address the labor 
situation, but Mallory consistently complained of top field commanders dragging their feet in 
providing men for navy service.63  His complaints grew louder as the war progressed and 
conscription laws passed by the Confederate Congress conflicted with earlier statutes passed to 
help solve the Navy’s labor shortages.64 
In addition to Mallory’s problems securing and maintaining skilled labor, workers he did 
find often went unpaid.  Many workers encountered long stretches when pay was delayed.  In 
some cases, installation commanders like William F. Lynch shifted funds intended for supply 
and machinery to pay disgruntled workers.65  Midshipman Richard Bacot complained of delays 
receiving pay while stationed in eastern North Carolina.66  The Confederate government’s 
inability to pay its workers and military personnel affected both battlefield morale and industrial 
efficiency.  The latter point was constantly made by Mallory to Confederate Treasury officials.67 
Each specific aspect of the Confederate States Navy’s shipbuilding complex faced 
operating an aggressive building program in an economically unsuitable and less-developed 
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industrial environment.  Shipyards, marine machinery manufacturing facilities, ordnance 
foundries, and powder works were scattered throughout the Confederacy.  While these facilities 
were initially situated in a few major ports and cities, many stations were relocated after the 
spring of 1862.  Union amphibious assaults on either side of the Confederacy, coupled with a 
strengthening Union blockade and the Union’s increased presence on major Confederate rivers, 
curtailed initial construction efforts.  Those same Union incursions not only forced a contraction 
and relocation of many Confederate naval manufacturing locations, but also disrupted the 
internal flow of supplies, raw materials, and other resources.   Railroads, reinforced by water-
based transportation, could marginally handle internal distribution before 1862.  After 
reorganization of facilities during spring and summer 1862, transporting valuable war materials 
became more difficult and ship construction efforts suffered. 
Shipbuilding Facilities 
New Orleans, Charleston, and Richmond became areas of Confederate naval 
construction.  Joining them were Mobile, Savannah, Memphis, and Wilmington, which boosted 
naval ship construction for Mallory’s department.  In total, thirty-six private yards existed in 
Confederate states.68  To some historians, this number is inaccurate and a bit low.69  They point 
to facilities located deep in the interior on rivers not being accurately counted in census numbers.  
Contributing to these discrepancies were the quick construction, and then destruction, of smaller 
yards.  Between 1850 and 1860, there were 145 shipbuilding facilities in the southern United 
States, including Maryland, Kentucky, and in the counties that became West Virginia.  Historian 
William Still found that the true number, probably never to be accurately represented, seemed to 
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be somewhere between 145 and 36.70  With border slave states staying in the Union, some 
shipbuilding and manufacturing facilities were unavailable to the Confederacy. 
Accompanying the Southern ports were two government operated ship building facilities.  
Pensacola was the first yard to be included, followed by the Gosport Navy Yard near Norfolk.  
The Pensacola Yard, despite being government owned, was older and outdated.  Its main 
activities emphasized light repair and refueling operations.  Conversely, the Gosport Yard was 
the largest and most modern shipbuilding facility in the South.71   
By late summer and fall 1861, Confederate naval construction was well under way.  
Activities accelerated steadily at ports and shipbuilding centers. Construction of wooden 
gunboats began alongside a few ironclad vessels.  Activities in larger ports like New Orleans and 
Norfolk were the focus of Confederate construction; however, smaller establishments on coastal 
and inland waters of eastern North Carolina, and at Columbus, Georgia and Jacksonville, Florida 
also worked feverishly to produce vessels capable of facing the Union blockade.  In total, 
twenty-six vessels were built or planned during the Confederacy’s first months, with only five 
ironclads among them.  Secretary Mallory’s report includes reference to preparations underway 
for building Maury’s fleet of one hundred small, wooden gunboats.72  
The loss of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Memphis in early 1862 to Union occupation 
signaled a transition as ship construction moved to the interior.  Ship construction in Virginia 
shifted to Richmond.  Once there, shipbuilding increased as established facilities (Tredegar Iron 
Works, the “Rocketts Yard,” and another shipyard across the James River) already existed.73  
Shipyards also operated on the Chattahoochee River in and south of Columbus, Georgia.  
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Smaller yards sprang up on the Yazoo River in Mississippi, the Great Pee Dee River in South 
Carolina, the Tombeegee River in Alabama, and inland rivers beyond the Union army’s control 
in eastern North Carolina near Kinston, Tarboro, and Halifax. Construction continued in the port 
cities of Mobile, Charleston, Savannah, and Wilmington as Union operations had not reached 
them. To streamline shipbuilding efforts, Mallory appointed John L. Porter as Chief Naval 
Constructor.74  
Ship Machinery 
Along with limited iron production, there were few ship machinery and steam engine 
production facilities.  A total of 115 facilities able to produce steam engines existed in the South.  
Many of these facilities were small and isolated and census records fail to elaborate on specific 
engines produced.  The smaller facilities often consisted of small, private shops in little coastal 
and river towns where shipping was a major component of the local economy.  The largest 
facility in the South was the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond.  Along with Tredegar, large 
foundries were located in Rome (Georgia), New Orleans, Mobile, and another smaller company 
in Richmond.75   It did not matter if hulls could be produced if a ship lacked suitable engines for 
propulsion.  An entirely sail driven fleet would have been a poor investment of money and 
resources.   
Mallory’s new navy encountered “numerous obstacles” as the Confederacy had 
insufficient means to build enough suitable steam engines.  “No marine engines, such as are 
required for the ordinary class of sloops of war, or frigates, have ever been made in the 
Confederate States, nor have workshops capable of producing them existed in either of them.”76  
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Transferring steam engines from confiscated and purchased ships solved the problem of 
propulsion for some ships.  Unfortunately, Confederate authorities needed as many ships as 
possible to combat superior Union naval numbers.  Vessels that might be used after alterations 
and refitting were rendered useless without engines.  In New Orleans in March 1862, for 
example, Lt. Isaac Brown reported four vessels under construction “with engines and boilers 
secured for two of them.”77 
 Marine machinery manufacture was the responsibility of Engineer in Chief William P. 
Williamson.  He reported directly to Mallory; but worked closely with the Office of Orders and 
Detail to secure, build, and transport engine parts for fitting out Confederate vessels. During the 
first phase of Confederate shipbuilding, confiscation and importing were Williamson’s best 
source for marine engines and machinery.  After reorganization, the Chief Engineer was able to 
see some Confederate marine machinery establishments become operational in addition to a few 
locations where prewar manufacturing remained. 
 Facilities responsible for producing marine engines and other machinery vital to gunboat 
propulsion encountered varying degrees of success.  New Orleans initially figured into the 
Confederacy’s plans with many small foundries like Leeds, Clark, Bennett & Lurgis, and Gretna, 
to name a few.78  Its potential was not realized because, in April 1862, Captain David G. 
Farragut’s Union squadron steamed up the Mississippi River and punched through the fledgling 
Confederate fleet, taking possession of the city.79  Following reorganization, the Charlotte (North 
Carolina) Navy Yard was expected to produce most marine machinery needed.80  Instead, 
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facilities located in Columbus, Georgia and in Richmond, Virginia provided the bulk of 
domestically produced heavy machinery used in Confederate warships.  The Shockoe Foundry in 
Richmond and the Columbus Iron Works also provided machinery for the Confederate States 
Navy.81   
Richmond’s industrial complex provided a suitable environment for marine engine 
production.  The Shockoe Foundry was originally run by the Talbott brothers.  They specialized 
in producing industrial machinery for agricultural and general manufacturing.  In March 1862, 
Mallory leased the establishment and immediately put the facility to work producing gunboat 
engines.  Many engines were required for Commander Maury’s one-hundred gunboat fleet.  
After the Battle of Hampton Roads and the change in Confederate building policy, engines 
produced by Shockoe were meant for ironclads.82   
 The Columbus Ironworks in Georgia also provided machinery.  Columbus was one of the 
most industrialized centers within the South.  Located on the Chattahoochee River, Columbus’s 
booming industry came about through agricultural trade and the importance of river steamboats.  
Many shops and sawmills operated to help repair and maintain the river boats so important to the 
region’s commerce.83  The industrial capabilities attracted Confederate war planners.  
Eventually, the potential for boiler manufacture at the Columbus Iron Works resulted in a 
Confederate States Navy lease of the facilities.84   
 The Confederate Naval Ironworks in Columbus helped build machinery and parts for 
ships all over the Confederacy.  The Muscogee Railroad was located nearby, extending across 
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Georgia; it provided a connection to Macon.  Furnaces, rolling mills, and blast machinery made 
the complex an important component where some new engines were built as well as repairing 
and rebuilding salvaged riverboat steam engines. This facility helped the dire situation facing the 
Confederacy following Norfolk’s surrender. It provided a much needed boost to the industrial 
manufacturing capability of Confederate shipbuilding and would “power a large percentage of 
the Confederate Navy.”85  
The Charlotte Navy Yard was an interesting establishment.  Its main function was to have 
been marine machine manufacture.86  In actuality, it served two functions, producing both marine 
machinery parts and articles associated with ordnance.  The facility maintained a number of 
workshops, machinery, and tools; many of these had been transferred from Norfolk.  After a 
large steam hammer, evacuated from Pensacola made its way to Charlotte, heavy forging 
operations commenced.87  The North Carolina Central Railroad and the South Carolina Railroad 
made this facility extremely important logistically.88  Once fully operational, the yard produced 
gun carriages and projectiles as well as propeller shafts for Confederate ships.89  Along with 
these facilities, many marine engines and parts continued to be smuggled in from Europe until 
the war’s end.    
Despite the ongoing operation and establishment of facilities in Richmond, Columbus, 
and Charlotte, domestic engine production in the Confederacy remained difficult.  Confederate 
evacuation of New Orleans curtailed the full Confederate potential for marine machinery 
production.  Additionally, the Chief Engineer complained that facilities best suited for engine 
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manufacture were “now engaged exclusively on ordnance work.”90  Hampering Williamson’s 
operations were insufficient skilled labor, marginal tools, and an inconsistent supply of raw 
materials.   
In Charlotte, Engineer Ashton Ramsey pushed operations night and day.  Despite his 
efforts to maintain enough workmen to run the facility, Ramsey reported little activity at his 
station.  He stated a need for seven machinists, eight blacksmiths, eight gun-carriage makers, two 
blockmakers, one pattern maker, one coppersmith, and two molders before a minimum output 
could be achieved.91  To correct the situation, Mallory attempted to recruit capable workers in 
Europe.  As many as twenty skilled workers were assigned to Charlotte, but only three actually 
reported.92  The aggravations experienced by Ramsey did not surprise Williamson.  He had 
claimed labor shortages would limit effective machinery manufacture many months earlier 
during reorganization.93  The Chief Engineer saw many men lost to the army through 
volunteered service or conscription.  Others, not native to the Confederacy, migrated overseas or 
to the northern states.94   
Most problematic to Williamson’s efforts was the lack of suitable tools and machinery, as 
well as the manufactured and raw materials needed for machine assembly.  The supply of iron, 
steel, tin, and rubber hampered production.  Once scarce materials were located, the tools and 
machinery used for manufacturing useful parts was often inadequate or not in working order. 
With skilled workmen, Chief Engineer Williamson found “exorbitant wages” for workers that 
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did not necessarily work each day because the inconsistent shipment of materials and tools 
limited what workers could accomplish.95 
Ordnance Production  
By early 1864, at the office of Ordnance and Hydrography, Commanders George Minor 
and John M. Brooke oversaw the most successful bureau within the Confederate States Navy.  
New ordnance facilities operated in Charlotte, Atlanta, and Selma, accompanied by the 
established facilities in Richmond.  These facilities could supply “…all the heavy ordnance 
required to arm the ironclads and other vessels completed and building; and to furnish guns for 
the defense of our ports…” Commander Brooke boasted.96  Maintaining that high level of 
production became more difficult during 1864 and 1865.    
Only two Southern facilities produced cannon at the outbreak of war, Tredegar Works in 
Richmond, and Bellona Foundry in Chesterfield, Virginia.  Tredegar, owned by Joseph R. 
Anderson, produced a total of 881 cannon between 1844 and 1860.97  Bellona Foundry, the 
smaller of the two, also made cannon for the United States government during prewar years.  It 
was owned by Dr. Junius L. Archer.98   
In addition to the Charlotte Navy Yard and the Atlanta Ordnance Works, the Confederacy 
opened another interior ordnance production site.  This facility, the Selma Gun Foundry and 
Naval Ordnance Works, became an important ordnance manufacturing facility.  Impressive, and 
arguably the most important Confederate naval station, Selma was located deep in the Alabama 
interior.  This facility was placed under the Confederate States Navy in June 1863 as 
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Commander Jones became commandant.99  Jones had extensive service and experience in ship 
construction and ordnance production.  He served on the CSS Virginia, commanded the CSS 
Chattahoochee during its final preparations for service, and also briefly commanded the 
Charlotte Navy Yard.100  A total of 73 Brooke guns were manufactured and shipped to various 
points within the Confederacy under Jones’s watch.  Of that total, 53 rifled and smoothbore guns 
were shipped directly to Mobile, bolstering Confederate defenses in that port city.101   
In Richmond, the Tredegar Iron Works, accompanied by the Richmond Ordnance Works 
and the Bellona Foundry, continued to produce heavy guns and projectiles for the Confederate 
States Navy.  The larger facility, Tredegar, manufactured the heavy artillery while the Richmond 
Ordnance Works helped rifle and band many guns produced by Tredegar.  In addition, large 
numbers of projectiles and other ordnance stores were manufactured.102  Along with the Selma 
Naval Gun Foundry and Ordnance Works, Tredegar Iron Works, accompanied by the Richmond 
Ordnance Works and Bellona Foundry, manufactured many effective artillery pieces for the 
Confederate States Navy after reorganization of shipbuilding and manufacturing establishments.  
A total of 265 siege and seacoast artillery pieces were produced at Tredegar, many of them 
ended up on Confederate vessels and at other naval stations along the coast.103 Bellona did not 
reach that output, producing 120 smaller pieces, mostly howitzers and three-inch rifles.104   
By mid-war, Commander Brooke and his facility commanders had difficulties obtaining 
suitable raw materials for marine engine manufacture. Either through depletion, the Union 
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blockade, or Union Army advances, ordnance production facilities faced the shortages head on.  
As the Selma Gun Foundry and Naval Ordnance Works became operational, Commander Jones 
experienced periods when no iron could be obtained for gun manufacture.  Additionally, little 
copper, tin, or zinc could be obtained, limiting fuse production.105  Raw material shortages were 
commonplace at all Confederate ordnance production locations.  As Commander Jones 
complained of iron shortages at his facility, Tredegar also felt the pinch as only six artillery 
pieces were manufactured during March 1864.106 
Ordnance foundries and their auxiliary facilities felt the sting of labor shortages.  
Lieutenant McCorkle, stationed at the Naval Ordnance Works in Atlanta, reported few 
mechanics employed at his facility.107   In Richmond, Commander Brooke called for an 
immediate reorganization and recall of skilled laborers to be employed by the Confederate States 
Navy: 
There are in the Southern States more than a sufficient number of mechanics to work 
these establishments…But these men have been swept into the Army en masse and their 
services can only be obtained by special and individual detail…In addition to the 
difficulty in procuring details, great inconvenience results from the existing system by 
which mechanics detailed from the Army for Navy work instead of being transferred and 
placed under the control of the Navy Department.108 
  
Advocating reorganization of the way the War and Navy Departments assigned skilled labor to 
war production went unheard.  By this point in the war, Mallory had little pull regarding 
personnel reorganization and allocation.  President Davis still held the Confederate Army and 
War Department operations close to his vest, influencing events on land, while virtually ignoring 
Mallory’s department.   
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Powder Works 
 Confederate States Navy powder works were initially situated in Petersburg, Virginia.  
This location, so close to Richmond’s industrial complex and the shipbuilding center at Norfolk, 
was ideal.  After the Confederacy retreated from Norfolk during spring 1862, the powder works 
were threatened by Union movements toward Richmond.  Confederate leadership felt it would be 
prudent to relocate the station away from the main battle front in Virginia.  Along with relocating 
shipbuilding operations to Richmond and ship machinery production to Charlotte, the powder 
works moved to South Carolina.   
Columbia, nestled in the center of the state, afforded a new location and better protection.  
Confederate Navy Engineer T. A. Jackson oversaw the relocation of the powder works and 
helped organize suitable facilities.109  This station operated until the capture of Columbia in 
February 1865. Before its capitulation, as many as 50 men worked at the establishment, 
procuring “20,000 pounds per month” despite its impending surrender.110 
Railroads and Rivers 
Even with all the manufacturing limitations, the biggest liability Mallory and his 
department needed to overcome was the inadequate Confederate transportation network.  By 
1861, the railroad had asserted its importance across the United States.  Within the Confederacy, 
railroad mileage lagged well behind the north.  The Confederacy possessed only 9,940 miles of 
track while the Union possessed 21,571 miles.111  Less railroad mileage made it more difficult to 
quickly connect the interdependent public and private yards dotting the southern coastline with 
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industrial and manufacturing facilities located at interior towns and cities.  Transportation 
difficulties, rail and water based, impacted the  
raw materials and supplies needed to run the many shipyards and manufacturing facilities 
producing ships, ordnance, engines, and machinery parts.  Compounding limited track mileage 
linking ports and cities was the way railroad construction began in many Southern regions.  In 
the decades preceding hostilities, political and military leaders were not instituting railroad 
construction. Merchants and business leaders began the process of laying rail to further 
individual interests.  Local ports and coastal cities had railroads built, extending into the interior 
towards large waterways and river systems.  These railroads increased the volume of products 
and commodities shipped from local ports.  
The Confederacy’s rivers were the real money makers for its economy.  Water based 
transportation of goods, even up to the Civil War, proved more profitable for businessmen, 
merchants, and farmers.  This was especially true along the Mississippi River.  Connecting with 
the Ohio River to the northeast and the Red and Missouri Rivers to the northwest, interregional 
trade between southern, border, and northern states made the Midwestern river valleys the mid-
nineteenth century interstate system.  Huge cargoes of bulk goods funneled down river.  One 
historian, Archer Jones, pointed to the large shipping discrepancy between riverboats and trains.  
The riverboats could carry loads of 500 tons or more while a locomotive could only pull some 15 
tons.112  New Orleans was the largest city and most important port in the southern United States 
for a reason, its trade and transportation based on the Mississippi River.  Prior to 1861, New 
Orleans exported more than all other major Southern ports combined by more than 
$15,000,000.113  Similarly, other ports such as Mobile, Savannah, and Richmond, all located on 
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or near important waterways, were critical to exporting Southern goods.  Southern railroads, 
some in close proximity to these port cities, enhanced water based trade.114 
The railroads helped save one important Southern port.  In the early 1830’s, Savannah, 
Georgia, was increasing its share of shipping and trade.  Charleston, South Carolina, one-
hundred miles to the north, lagged in commercial importance.  Materials and products produced 
in interior South Carolina and Georgia found it cheaper to move products down the Savannah 
River, bypassing Charleston by going through Savannah.  South Carolina merchants and 
business leaders needed to reclaim some regional commerce or risk financial ruin.115  
A railroad, the Charleston and Hamburg, was built to cut into Savannah’s share of trade.  
This railway extended deep into interior South Carolina close to the Savannah River.  The line 
started at Hamburg, on the north side of the Savannah River, and stretched 136 miles across 
South Carolina to Charleston.  This rail line opened the door for cotton and other goods to flow 
into Charleston, pumping renewed vigor into the port.  Interestingly, this southern railroad was 
the longest track in the world in 1833.116 
Economically, the railroad helped Charleston immensely during subsequent decades.  
Other ports, large and small, followed Charleston’s lead.  In the South, lines were financed 
locally and built for economic expediency.  In most cases, these spurs extending into the interior 
seldom linked together.  Lines extended to rivers and canals to help expedite commerce. Rival 
ports and cities preferred to stay isolated and protect local economic interests.   Ports throughout 
Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia continued to build these independent lines until the 
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beginning of the Civil War.  With cotton continuing to be a sought after crop, port cities wanted 
to safeguard their share of the financial pie.117 
The development of railroads continued in the states that eventually comprised the 
Confederacy.  Railroads extended into the interior from New Orleans and Mobile on the Gulf of 
Mexico.  In Florida, there were smaller rail lines in the western panhandle connecting to 
Montgomery, Alabama.  On the eastern side of Florida, there were no prewar connections with 
lines in Georgia.  Tennessee lines joined at Chattanooga, helping to bridge eastern and western 
sections of the South. Railroads in Arkansas and Texas were internal and did not run into other 
states.  Most lines in Texas were situated close to Houston, near the Gulf coast.118   
With small railroad lines extending into the interior from many port cities and towns, a 
larger network of tracks slowly took shape.  Lines gradually came together to form railroads 
connecting states and regions. Along the Chattahoochee River, rail lines were built to connect 
communities within the Georgia and Alabama interior.  These smaller, shorter lines helped 
commerce grow along the Chattahoochee, Flint, and Apalachicola Rivers flowing into the Gulf 
of Mexico.119  Still, there was only one important east-west connection functioning in the 
Confederate States.  It stretched from Richmond, weaving its way through Tennessee and 
eventually ending at the Mississippi River.  One other important east-west line was being built 
from Georgia to the southwest, in the direction of Vicksburg, Mississippi.  This second line was 
incomplete, with many gaps and natural obstacles holding up its completion.120 
 The Confederacy also contained an important north-south route.  This route was the 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad in North Carolina.  Running north, this line traveled through 
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Petersburg to Richmond.  Moving south, this line extended into South Carolina from 
Wilmington, eventually connecting with Columbia as the Wilmington and Manchester railroad.  
From Columbia, rail connections stretched into Georgia.   
 Another problem with the Confederate rail network rested with its initial construction.  
The railroads were built to move agricultural products.  Prior to the war, 75 percent of Southern 
rail freight, on certain railroads, consisted of cotton.121  Transporting large amounts of military 
materials and resources, including soldiers, artillery, and heavy machinery, was questionable.  
Different rail gauges impeded swift transportation along most railroads by shifting materials 
every time the line met another line.122  Additionally, regardless of gauge, in some Southern 
cities, different railroads seldom connected. George Edgar Turner explained:  
Richmond was the terminus of five railroads.  These facilities made it easy to move 
passengers and freight to but not through the city.  Richmond suffered the severe 
handicap common to most Southern cities, large and small.  Municipalities had invested 
heavily in early railroad building.  A city which had invested in a railroad’s securities 
expected the road to serve its interests.  Since it received no profit or other benefit from 
passengers and freight merely passing through, it was strongly opposed to direct track 
connections between lines meeting within it.123  
 
Stopping, unloading, and reloading supplies onto other trains from rival lines wasted much time 
and energy.  Complicating mass movement further was a lack of double tracking.  Most Southern 
rails extending inland from ports and away from cities were single track lines.  Unable to ship 
materials both ways to vital areas of combat and military manufacture at the same time hampered 
supply, transportation, and construction.124   
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 Maintenance of the Confederate railroad tracks was problematic.  Only three Confederate 
mills produced railroad tracks: Tredegar, Atlanta Rolling Mill, and Etowah Iron Works.  These 
facilities had access to raw materials for iron manufacture but only enough to operate at a 
fraction of full capability.  Tredegar, the largest facility, was unable to help as a result of the 
government’s demands for iron plating, machinery, and heavy ordnance.  If all existing facilities 
had been able to operate fully, “their output would have been less than 20,000 tons, an amount 
far short of the 50,000 tons per year needed to maintain existing tracks.”125  Immediate 
production of necessary war machinery and instruments trumped preservation of existing 
railroads.  Manufacturing new rail lines were not a realistic option once the problem of disrupted 
internal distribution was recognized.  The Union blockade eliminated any chance new railroad 
supplies would be imported, the South’s main source of antebellum track mileage.   
With reorganized Confederate shipbuilding relocated in the interior after mid-1862, 
problems remained for Secretary Mallory and his department.  The patchwork interior facilities 
exacerbated the ongoing logistical struggle.  Producing marine engines in one location, 
propellers at another, and heavy artillery somewhere else, proved difficult to orchestrate. 
Shipping machinery and artillery to different shipyards relied upon an increasingly suspect 
transportation network.   
The Confederate transportation network was in a constant state of upheaval following 
reorganization of shipbuilding activities.  Increased Union activity on land and at sea adversely 
affected movement of Confederate military supplies and materials.  With the Union operating 
unchecked on the Mississippi River, the Confederacy was effectively cut into two separate 
regions by July 1863.  Union blockading operations and raids disrupted trade and the movement 
of military materials on other important rivers as well.   
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Without moving supplies on rivers, an increased strain upon Confederate railways 
occurred.  As the Union Navy advanced up the Mississippi River and became a more effective 
blockading force, transportation of supplies and materials became increasingly dependent upon 
clogged railroads.  Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon reported the deplorable 
condition of southern railroads to President Davis: 
With the coasting trade cut off and the command by the enemy, through their naval 
superiority, of all our great rivers, reliance for internal trade and communication has been 
necessarily on the railroads.  These were never designed nor provided with means for the 
task now incumbent upon them.  They have, besides, suffered much from the inability to 
command the supplies of iron, implements, and machinery they habitually 
imported…Some of the shorter and least important roads must be sacrificed and the iron 
and machinery taken for the maintenance of the leading lines and for the construction of 
some essential and less exposed interior links of connection.126  
 
In addition to Union blockading activities, Union army movements deeper into Confederate 
territory cut off some key rail junctions.  As cities came under Union occupation, more and more 
railroads became useless to Confederate military planners.  After the Union captured 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, in September 1863, an important east-west route was cut, isolating 
parts of the Confederacy from Lynchburg and Richmond, Virginia.   
With Chattanooga’s occupation, access to important mining operations and coal deposits 
was blocked.  Securing raw materials from North Carolina and Virginia might possibly make up 
for lost access to western Tennessee.  The biggest problem in securing other resources, Capt. 
Mitchell, commander of the Office of Orders and Detail, explained, was the problem supplying 
so many stations.  He cited transportation conditions between places like Columbus and Selma, 
as well as Wilmington with Charleston and Charlotte as “uncertain and deficient.”127  As these 
areas would benefit from reallocating raw materials from other areas, getting needed supplies to 
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maintain production remained a challenge.  In the absence of sufficient coal reserves, 
commanders in Savannah and Charleston resorted to burning wood.128 
Hampering Mallory’s construction efforts was the Confederate War Department.  When 
it came to moving supplies, materials for the Confederate Army were usually given priority.  
George Minor reported that railways clogged with supplies for the army hindered operations at 
the Charlotte Navy Yard in 1862.129   Later in the conflict, as things looked more desperate for 
the Confederacy, army officers and War Department officials expressed the attitude that their 
department be shown preference for railroad transport.  Major S. B French suggested “that every 
other branch of the public defense should be subservient to that which we can alone rely.”130  
Major French may have had a point, but to Mallory railroads carried needed ordnance, parts, and 
machinery into shipyards and other naval facilities.   
Complicating the Confederate States Navy’s use of Southern railways was Mallory’s 
pursuit of an ironclad fleet.  Supplying different foundries, mills, and shipyards with needed iron 
plating and machinery became increasingly difficult heading into the war’s second year.  With a 
tightening Union blockade, importing needed iron and machinery became limited.  Mallory’s 
emphasis on ironclad construction helped deplete the Confederacy’s railroad network: 
I think it is impossible to obtain any iron unless it is seized.  The Petersburg Railroad 
agent says that he must have the old iron on the Petersburg road to replace the worn out 
rails on the road.  The Kinston and Raleigh road requires the iron taken below Kinston to 
replace the iron on the Charlotte and [North Carolina] road, and these roads are 
considered a military necessity…The whole subject of [railroad] iron was laid before the 
North Carolina legislature and I am unable to obtain any iron.131 
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Needing iron for internal transportation, while simultaneously building ironclad vessels 
complicated logistical issues for all Confederate gunboat construction efforts.  Depletion of 
railroads by cannibalization or overuse based upon battlefield conditions and necessity did not 
help keep the interdependent network of shipyards and manufacturing facilities tied together.   
 Using isolated and less strategic tracks for ironclad construction and maintenance of more 
important lines was one problem.  Another deficiency of the Confederate rail system was limited 
rolling stock and even fewer locomotives.  With industry engaged in producing ordnance, iron 
plating, and marine machinery, maintenance and upkeep of existing rail cars became harder. 
Before the war, Tredegar had been the South’s principle producer of locomotives, but had not 
produced any since 1860.132  During the antebellum period, the South only produced 19 of 470 
locomotive engines collectively.133  As a result, available cars deteriorated by as much as 25 
percent, as reported by Confederate Assistant Adjutant-General William M. Wadley in April 
1863.  Wadley expressed the need for the Confederacy to obtain 31 engines and 930 cars to 
sustain military transportation needs.134   
 The Confederate States Navy was dependent upon a very limited transportation network 
to move important materials for shipbuilding efforts.  With the Union blockade tightening its 
grip upon the Confederate coastline, closing major Southern ports and the Mississippi River, 
transporting materials fell onto the tracks of an inadequate railroad network.  The rail system 
suffered from poor management and maintenance, adversely affecting internal supply of stations 
and manufacturing facilities.   Heavy industry was busy forging ordnance, marine machinery, 
and iron plating for many vessels.  Military leaders overlooked the importance of keeping 
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adequate working track lines for heavy transportation.  Rolling stock and engines suffered 
without proper upkeep.  Union army and naval units interrupted replacement parts available to 
fix these important conduits.  Military necessity disrupted sound organization and the 
implementation of policies that could have preserved Confederate railroads.   
Conclusion 
At the beginning of hostilities, the Confederate economy and industrial infrastructure 
lagged behind its northern neighbors.  During the decades leading to the Civil War, emphasis on 
an agriculturally based economy hurt diversification of the Southern economy.  Heavy industry 
and manufacturing capabilities existed in some limited areas, but not on a widespread scale.  
Fewer commercial and industrial centers supported a smaller population base than the Union.  
Fewer skilled workers were available to run the few shops that could forge ordnance and heavy 
machinery.  Industrial and manufacturing limitations created a smaller railroad network, 
complemented by river and canal based trade and transportation.   
 These economic and industrial inadequacies adversely affected development of the 
Confederate States Navy.  Each ship built, ironclad or wooden, depended upon the same 
economic framework regardless of the materials used.  Transportation deficiencies, exacerbated 
by Union troop and naval movements that cut off important material sources and supplies, were 
only one problem.  Cannibalization of the Confederate railroad network by poor management 
and Mallory’s directive to construct ironclads at the expense of wooden vessels crippled the 
internal flow of goods and materials for shipbuilding at all stations.  Making Mallory’s efforts 
even more frustrating was the Navy Department’s subservient position within the Davis 
administration.  The lower position was enhanced by a determined enemy that necessitated quick 
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response to Confederate Army needs.  Important shipbuilding centers located along the Southern 
coastline were lost before full scale navy shipbuilding efforts could be finalized. 
 This chapter focused broadly on Confederate limitations in producing naval vessels.  No 
one area of ship manufacture was meticulously examined.  Instead, an holistic picture has been 
given demonstrating the industrial and manufacturing limitations Confederate naval planners 
faced as they built a navy.  Ship construction, marine machinery manufacture, and ordnance 
forging were the three areas Confederate naval leaders had to keep functioning to produce 
vessels.  The Confederate economy was marginally equipped to build a navy in the face of 
wartime obstructions. 
 Taking all these aspects of Confederate shipbuilding capabilities into consideration 
enabled a closer examination of shipbuilding at the regional and local level.  Confederate 
wooden gunboat construction had two phases.  The first phase was more aggressive, consisting 
of a building program aimed at three different ship types: Porter gunboats, Maury gunboats, and 
altered confiscated vessels.  This changed after the Battle of Hampton Roads in 1862.  Along 
with Confederate reorganization, Mallory focused his department’s attention on building 
ironclads, as wooden gunboat construction became a secondary effort.  The next two chapters 
will focus on two separate phases of wooden gunboat construction.   
A regional look at northeastern North Carolina will examine the more aggressive first 
phase of wooden gunboat construction at multiple yards.  Another, more detailed, look at local 
wooden gunboats will cover construction of the CSS Peedee at Mars Bluff on the Great Pee Dee 
River in South Carolina.  The construction of a gunboat at Mars Bluff occurred after Confederate 
reorganization of facilities and changed direction of Confederate construction policy that 
advocated ironclads over wooden vessels.  Having a clearer picture of national level economic, 
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industrial, and manufacturing inadequacies will bring these limitations into focus at the regional 
and local levels.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4: First Phase in Eastern North Carolina 
North Carolina’s geographic position within the United States put it in a precarious 
position during the secession crisis of late 1860 and early 1861.  The actions of South Carolina 
and Virginia were critical to North Carolina’s involvement in the Civil War.  South Carolina 
began the secession crisis in December 1860, and then confirmed the newly formed Provisional 
Confederate government’s resolve in the bombardment of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, 
April 1861.  Actions taken in South Carolina brought the reality of armed conflict to North 
Carolina’s doorstep.  Placing North Carolina in an even tougher position was the secession of 
Virginia on April 17.  North Carolina was then surrounded by two states in open conflict with the 
United States government. 
 Newly elected President Lincoln acted quickly and ordered a 75,000 man army raised to 
contain the rebellious activities occurring in Charleston. Lincoln’s call on North Carolina for 
troops to quell the rebellion was too much.  North Carolina Governor John W. Ellis replied to 
Lincoln’s proclamation: 
Your dispatch is [received] and if genuine which its extraordinary character leads me to 
doubt I have to say in reply that I regard the levy of troops made by the administration for 
the purpose of subjugating the states of the South is in violation of the constitution and a 
gross usurpation of power.  I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the 
country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people.  You can get no troops from 
North Carolina.  I will reply more in detail when your call is received by mail.135 
   
Governor Ellis’s terse reply mirrored the sentiments of many southerners despite strong Unionist 
feelings in his state.  North Carolinians prepared to wage war against a country they helped 
create.  On May 20, 1861, North Carolina became the last state to secede from the Union.   
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 After leaving the United States and joining the Confederacy, North Carolina played a 
pivotal role in Confederate military planning.  North Carolina was in a geographically important 
position possessing a sizable coastline along the Atlantic Ocean with a large network of barrier 
islands shielding sounds and navigable rivers.  North Carolina’s coast made it an inviting staging 
area for Confederate commerce raiding.  The Wilmington and Weldon Railroad ran a few miles 
west of the eastern coastal plain and directly linked Wilmington with Petersburg, Virginia.  The 
rail line’s carrying important military supplies was important to the Confederacy’s chances of 
victory.  Finally, North Carolina’s inland waterways connected its northern sounds with Norfolk 
via the Dismal Swamp and Albemarle and Chesapeake Canals.  Control of North Carolina’s 
coast and inland waterways was tactically and strategically important to both the Union and 
Confederacy.136 
Commerce raiding, blockade running, and maintaining control of the Wilmington and 
Weldon Railroad were important activities considered by Confederate military planners.  
Confederate Navy Secretary Stephen Mallory also saw North Carolina’s addition to the 
Confederacy as an opportunity to expand Confederate States Navy shipbuilding efforts.  With a 
large coastline accompanied by many navigable rivers, components of shipbuilding capabilities 
were present in many North Carolina coastal towns and ports.  That same geography, though 
making North Carolina strategically important, curtailed large scale manufacturing and industrial 
development along its coast.    
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Figure 4-1. Map of eastern North Carolina (Source: “Harpers Weekly” December 1863). 
 
Barrier islands lined North Carolina’s coast protecting several large sounds.  The two 
largest sounds, Pamlico and Albemarle, were separated by Roanoke Island. This left narrow 
Croatan Sound for ships to travel.  Behind the barrier islands and shallow sounds were numerous 
rivers, many of which were navigable deep into North Carolina’s interior.  The Pasquotank, 
Roanoke, Tar-Pamlico, Neuse, and Cape Fear Rivers were a few of the main waterways in 
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eastern North Carolina.  Wilmington, New Bern, Washington, and Elizabeth City were important 
ports established along these rivers.137  These ports connected smaller establishments situated on 
the interior rivers with other markets for exporting and trading of goods.  
North Carolina’s Antebellum Economy 
From colonial times until 1860, commerce in North Carolina was dependent upon 
producing naval stores.  During the antebellum period, North Carolina dominated American 
naval store production, producing close to 96 percent by 1840.138  In the twenty years before the 
Civil War, that number changed little as North Carolinians continued to depend upon lush pine 
forests extending deep into the countryside for economic prosperity.  The tar and pitch obtained 
from burning pine was instrumental in construction of wooden sailing vessels and barges.  Inland 
towns, like Greenville on the Tar River and Fayetteville on the Cape Fear River, sent North 
Carolina’s most lucrative cash crop downriver to the ports of Washington and Wilmington ready 
for construction or exportation.  North Carolina had an entrenched maritime tradition, an 
economic and geographic relationship with the sea.   
Even though a special relationship existed, the unique geography of its coastline 
hampered development of ports along the coast. During the antebellum period, only Ocracoke 
Inlet provided ports along the Neuse, Tar-Pamlico, Roanoke, and Pasquotank River’s access to 
the Atlantic Ocean.  In 1846, Hatteras and Oregon Inlet were opened during a large storm and its 
associated wave action.139  Of these two new inlets, Hatteras was the new entry point larger 
vessels could safely use when entering North Carolina’s northern sounds.140  Of all North 
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Carolina’s rivers, only the Cape Fear flowed directly into the Atlantic Ocean, strengthening the 
port of Wilmington, while the other rivers flowed into the sounds.   
The completion of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad in 1840 benefited Wilmington 
further.  This railway eventually connected Wilmington directly with Petersburg and Richmond, 
Virginia.  The location of the railroad west of the fall line isolated the inland ports further.  
Merchants had access to the state’s lone ocean reaching river and an important rail line 
connecting smaller towns in North Carolina’s interior to the Atlantic.  Wilmington’s position on 
the Cape Fear River and that river’s direct access to the ocean, coupled with new railroads, 
entrenched its position as the largest city and port in North Carolina.141 
In addition to Wilmington, Norfolk also benefited from North Carolina’s geographic 
situation in the northeastern coastal region.  During the 1830’s, residents of the Albemarle region 
noticed economic opportunity bypassing them at neighboring ports to the north and south.  
Restricted access to the inland ports of northeastern North Carolina caused many merchants to 
ship cargoes and goods from Wilmington and Norfolk for 25 percent less than shipping items 
through ports on Albemarle or Pamlico Sound.  Shallower, more hazardous waters and increased 
shipping times proved costly for some merchants and shipping companies.142  As a result, 
Wilmington, and especially Norfolk, developed faster and became larger commercial centers 
than ports located between them. 
Throughout the antebellum period, local newspapers in the Albemarle region printed 
scathing editorials detailing the economic hardships created by neighboring ports funneling 
goods past smaller towns.  In 1830, the editor of the Edenton Gazette characterized the state of 
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Virginia as “a bloodsucker” sapping the life from smaller North Carolina ports.143  Animosity of 
northeastern North Carolina residents did not subside.  In 1849, the Plymouth Weekly’s editor 
stated, “a great quantity of produce, lumber, and naval stores coming down the Roanoke passing 
right by Plymouth, and making Norfolk the depot…Why is it, that North Carolinians had rather 
enrich and build up other cities in other states, than have respectable towns within their own 
borders.”144   
Inland ports and towns along North Carolina’s sounds and rivers carved niches, despite 
larger neighboring ports and geographic limitations.   Port towns, like New Bern, Beaufort, 
Washington, and Elizabeth City, grew slowly.  Agricultural products and naval stores continued 
to be traded, sold, and exported.  Smaller ships and schooners were built, as well as a few steam 
powered vessels.  After opening the Dismal Swamp and Chesapeake and Albemarle Canals, 
relationships between smaller ports of northeastern North Carolina and Norfolk were reinforced.  
Acting as the interstate highways of the period, goods and products were sent downriver to the 
smaller ports of Washington, New Bern, and Elizabeth City from interior towns, then went to 
Norfolk via the canals.  The inland ports acted as collecting points for the inland waters of North 
Carolina, yet bulk cargoes continued, and preferred to flow through Wilmington and Norfolk.   
No matter the size or location of a port, a maritime culture permeated North Carolina’s 
coastal region.  That culture factored into Stephen Mallory’s ship construction operations.  
During each phase of Confederate shipbuilding, North Carolina contributed resources, 
manpower, and shipyards to the Confederate naval efforts.  Both ironclads and wooden gunboats 
were built in North Carolina; however, the emphasis during the first phase of construction from 
1861 through early 1862 focused on wooden gunboats.   
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Wilmington, North Carolina  
At the Civil War’s beginning, Wilmington seemed to be a good place to begin warship 
construction.  The state’s largest port was home to numerous shipbuilders, with nineteen listed in 
the 1860 census.  More than twenty-seven ships, including seven steamers, were built between 
1815 and 1860.  In addition to the many shipbuilders, Wilmington possessed the Hart and Bailey 
Ironworks and the Thomas E. Roberts Foundry.  Propeller shafts and marine machinery could be 
produced locally.145 
Instead, Confederate States Navy construction concentrated in North Carolina’s northern 
sounds.  Wilmington was initially overlooked by naval planners as a separate shipbuilding and 
navy station location.  Governor Ellis believed that Forts Caswell and Johnston were strong 
enough to repel any attack attempted by Union naval units.146  Supporting the forts guarding the 
Cape Fear River’s entrance were two converted vessels, Uncle Ben and Arctic.   
Uncle Ben, a tug, was converted shortly after North Carolina’s secession. The vessel was 
operated by the North Carolina Quartermaster’s Department until all ships were turned over to 
Confederate control.147  Arctic, another converted vessel, was built in 1855 in Philadelphia.  
Used as a lightship, it ended up in Wilmington.  As the clouds of war began to roll towards North 
Carolina, local shipbuilder James Cassidy refitted the vessel to patrol the Cape Fear and help 
repel a potential attack.148  These two vessels represented Confederate naval power on the Cape 
Fear River for the war’s first year. 
 
                                                 
145
 R. Thomas Campbell, Storm Over Carolina: The Confederate Navy’s Struggle For Eastern North Carolina 
(Nashville: Cumberland House Publishing, 2005), 184-187; New Hanover County 1860 Federal Census.  
146
 Wilmington Daily Journal, June 13, 1861.    
147
 ORN ser. 2 vol. 1, 270; Campbell, Storm Over Carolina, 183; Edwin L. Combs III, “On Duty At Wilmington: 
The Confederate Navy On The Cape Fear River” MA Thesis, East Carolina University, 1996, 11.  
148
 Money, ed. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. 1 353; New Hanover County, North Carolina, 
1860 Federal Census, 132; Combs, “On Duty At Wilmington,” 11-12. 
 
  
55 
 
North Carolina’s Northern Sounds: Strategic Construction   
Wilmington certainly possessed the shipbuilding capability Mallory needed, yet was 
neglected for strategic purposes.  Norfolk’s position in southeastern Virginia made strengthening 
North Carolina’s northeastern coast more important than Wilmington.    The northern sounds and 
canals connected those vulnerable inlets with Norfolk, one of the two most important 
Confederate shipbuilding centers.  There were no large forts on the barrier islands guarding the 
inlets at Hatteras, Ocracoke, and Oregon.  In addition to having few land based fortifications, 
state and Confederate leaders viewed purchasing and converting gunboats for Pamlico and 
Albemarle Sound as more important than the Cape Fear River. 
Even with protecting Norfolk in mind, Mallory and Confederate States Navy authorities 
were still slow in asserting control over North Carolina waters.  Transferring the Confederate 
capital from Montgomery to Richmond contributed to the slow exchange of institutional control.   
The assimilation of Virginia and North Carolina into the Confederate national structure occurred 
while the Confederate government moved delaying communications and causing uncertainty 
among political and military leaders.  Arranging the state navies was a frustrating process.  
Mallory’s dream of an ironclad vessel capable of breaking through a forming Union Navy 
blockade kept him focused on activities occurring in Richmond and Norfolk.  Once his 
department was running and the Norfolk Navy Yard operating, Mallory could look to other 
commands and states.   
The command of North Carolina waters, called the naval defenses of Virginia and North 
Carolina, was created in late July 1861.  Confederate officials relieved state authorities who had 
been operating North Carolina’s naval forces since session months before.  The command 
stretched from the waters south of Norfolk to Wilmington and was first held by Captain Samuel 
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Barron.149  Barron took command as Confederate commerce raiders Gordon, Mariner, Raleigh, 
Teaser, Winslow, and York created havoc among Union shipping traveling past the Outer Banks.  
In addition to the raiders, Forts Hatteras and Clark moved towards completion.  Positioned at 
Hatteras Inlet, these two forts hoped to keep enemy vessels out of the northern sounds.150  Union 
military planners acted quickly and organized an expedition to neutralize the Confederate 
raiders.  Major General Benjamin Butler and Commodore Silas H. Stringham led an assault 
against Hatteras Inlet and forced their way into Pamlico Sound on August 29, 1861.151  
Despite the attack by Butler and Stringham, ship construction operations commenced.  
Mallory continued efforts begun by North Carolina state authorities as more ships were 
purchased and converted into coastal and harbor defense vessels.  Meanwhile, in Richmond, 
Mallory began planning ships focused upon shallow water and harbor defense.  The inadequate 
defense of Hatteras Inlet forced Mallory to embrace a wider wooden shipbuilding program 
despite his preference for fewer, technologically superior ironclad vessels.  Albemarle and 
Pamlico Sounds needed gunboats to help protect North Carolina’s coast and Virginia’s southern 
flank.152   
The Confederate States Navy commenced North Carolina’s wooden gunboat construction 
in late 1861.  Two inland ports, Washington and Elizabeth City, were the first locations where 
Confederate shipbuilding took place.  Smaller ships capable of patrolling the inland sounds and 
rivers could be built at these locations.  Moreover, as long as the inland sounds and Roanoke 
Island remained under Confederate control, both locations could benefit, if needed, from 
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unobstructed communication and supplies from Norfolk through the inland canals.  Norfolk’s 
shipbuilding capabilities north of the sounds could not overcome logistical limitations that 
Confederate naval authorities faced in North Carolina during the first phase of wooden gunboat 
construction.  Ultimately, construction efforts failed because of limited ordnance available, 
shortages of suitable engines, few supplies, a lack of large scale industry, and Union advances 
into North Carolina. 
Washington, North Carolina 
Washington was positioned on the Pamlico River southeast of Greenville.  This inland 
port developed into an important shipbuilding and commercial town. Washington Township was 
established in the 1770’s by James Bonner; however, the first official reference to the town 
occurred five years later in the journal of the Council of Safety in Halifax. After the end of the 
Revolutionary War and Constitutional Convention, a local shipbuilding industry emerged in the 
small harbor.153  
At the end of the eighteenth century, Washington officially became a port.  In 1790, the 
federal government established a customs office.  During the initial stages of Washington’s 
development, the Blount brothers, John Gray, Thomas, and William, grew their successful 
mercantile firm and extended into shipbuilding.  Brigs and sloops were contracted and built as 
Washington’s influence as a shipping center within the Tar-Pamlico River basin grew.  Naval 
stores, including turpentine and lumber, as well as agricultural products like corn and tobacco, 
moved down the Tar River from Tarboro and Greenville, passing through Washington on their 
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way to other markets and ports.  “River based trade and shipbuilding dominated the local 
economy of Washington for the next six decades” until the Civil War.154   
As the Blount family continued successful operations, other merchants and businessmen 
invested in Washington’s potential.  The Fowle family moved to Washington from New England 
in 1812.  Josiah and Luke were the first brothers to relocate, later joined by youngest brother 
Sam.155  As the Fowle family settled and began business, war loomed.  In June 1812, the United 
States went to war with Great Britain.  The British preferred to focus on established commercial 
centers, so North Carolina’s coast was left largely unmolested.156  Protection by the Outer Banks 
allowed American privateers and coastal traders to operate almost unchecked from North 
Carolina’s sounds while other ports struggled.  Shipping tonnages in Washington increased from 
3,700 tons to almost 5,000 from 1814 through 1820.157  Beaufort County’s population also rose 
during the second decade of the nineteenth century from 7,203 to 9,850.158   
As wartime shifted back to peace, regular commercial and trade activities persisted.  
Exporting naval stores and agricultural products continued as flat bottomed barges carried goods 
down the Tar River to Washington.  The Fowle mercantile firm grew and incorporated many 
vessels, purchasing five schooners, four brigs, and one sloop between 1815 and 1819.  
Accompanying those ten vessels was a gradual accumulation of valuable real estate near the 
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waterfront.159  Despite continued commercial growth following the war with Great Britain, ship 
construction fell noticeably during the next two decades.  William N. Still found “only two or 
three vessels, usually schooners, were built per year.”160   
Following the stagnation of the 1820’s, Washington experienced a considerable increase 
in shipbuilding.  By 1830, Beaufort County had almost 11,000 residents.161 Hezekiah Farrow 
built the first marine railway in Washington.  This equipment increased activities for Farrow’s 
company, where he focused on repairing vessels.  Farrow’s son, Joseph, built a ship in 1847 
called the Benjamin F. Hanks.162  In addition to the Farrow’s and the Fowle mercantile firm, 
other shipbuilders in Washington included Burton Shipp, William Tannahill, and, briefly, Hull 
Anderson.163 
In 1845, the Tarboro Press wrote of the shipbuilding and commercial community 
developing.  “Washington is a delightful place…wharves and shipping gives it the appearance of 
a commercial city.  About midway of the [river] is an island (called the Castle) owned by Abner 
Neale covered with workshops…for shipbuilding…” the paper boasted.164  Although published a 
few years before the peak of shipbuilding, that newspaper foreshadowed Washington’s 
importance as a shipbuilding center.  By the beginning of the 1850’s, ownership of the few 
shipping and shipbuilding companies changed hands as new companies formed.  Washington 
was home to the successful Myers & Company and the firm of I.W. & U.H. Ritch, which bought 
out Burton Shipp’s shipbuilding firm.165  During the fifties, Washington became the most 
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important shipbuilding town in North Carolina.  Twenty-three ship carpenters lived in Beaufort 
County and three marine railways operated.166    During a two and a half year stretch, from 1855-
1857, twelve vessels were built, but a sharp decline followed.  The Panic of 1857 resulted in 
economic turmoil and only one vessel was built before the Civil War.167  
Elizabeth City, North Carolina 
Elizabeth City was the other sound-side North Carolina port that participated in 
Confederate wooden gunboat construction.  Located in Pasquotank County, the city was initially 
chartered in 1793; however, the area had been settled more than a century earlier.  When the 
Dismal Swamp Canal connected the inland waters of Virginia and North Carolina, the town was 
incorporated.  As the canal’s southern entrance point, Elizabeth City became an important 
distribution point in North Carolina’s inland waters.168 
The Dismal Swamp Canal became a reality after Virginia legislators passed a bill for 
digging the canal in 1787, followed by North Carolina legislators in 1790.169  Elizabeth City 
became the southern terminus of the canal.  After almost two decades of construction, the first 
“flats” moved through the canal in 1807. 170  Shingle flats were the only vessels to use the canal 
until 1814, when a twenty ton deck boat transited the canal with a cargo of bacon and barley.  
The voyage started on the Roanoke River near Scotland Neck and ended in Norfolk, representing 
the unification of Albemarle Sound and Chesapeake Bay.171 
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As the Dismal Swamp Canal moved towards completion, Elizabeth City established local 
government.  The town became the seat of local government in Pasquotank County on June 3, 
1800.  Its population was small but continued to grow during the first twenty years of the 
nineteenth century as it rose from 677 inhabitants in 1820 to almost 1,000 in 1830172 
Elizabeth City also demonstrated a steady increase in economic activity.  By the mid-
1820’s, Elizabeth City trailed only Wilmington in the number of North Carolina vessel 
enrollments.173  Nineteen general merchandising stores ran advertisements in local newspapers, 
hoping to capitalize on the town’s growth and the canal’s importance.174  In addition to increased 
local purchasing and commercial shipping activity, transportation companies began operations 
connecting the inland sound ports with Virginia.  The Virginia and North Carolina 
Transportation Company formed and invested in the Petersburg, a steamboat that operated out of 
Elizabeth City.  As trade increased with Norfolk, Elizabeth City continued to ship cargoes 
through Ocracoke Inlet.  During the period of economic vitalization associated with the canal, 
three-fourths of trade from North Carolina still traveled through Ocracoke Inlet.175   The town’s 
position as the first large port in Albemarle Sound made its location ideal for growth. 
Economic expansion and distribution of goods in the vicinity of Elizabeth City 
waterways created the need for a bigger shipbuilding and repair industry in the town.  Anthony 
Butler and Charles Grice were two of the first shipbuilders, establishing shipbuilding companies 
during the nineteenth century’s first two decades.  Later, William F. Martin, a lawyer, operated a 
shipyard along with shipbuilding firms owned by Richard Overman, Timothy Hunter, C. M. 
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Laverty, and Burgess and Lamb.176  The latter three built three vessels in the fall of 1849.  These 
three ships were impressive vessels “with two intended for West Indian trade and the other for 
the canal.”177   
A report published in 1856 stated that as many as 119 vessels participated in commerce 
from Elizabeth City shipyards.  The vessels included “one brig, ninety-three schooners, five 
sloops, four sloop boats, and sixteen barges with a weight of 5,863.”178  Specific information 
about whether these 119 vessels were built from the keel up or simply repaired is not clear.  The 
1860 Pasquotank County Census showed nine ship carpenters living in or near Elizabeth City, 
alongside many mariners, vessel captains, and around 30 merchants.179   
Wooden Gunboat Construction Begins 
Confederate construction efforts at Washington and Elizabeth City did not occur 
immediately or simultaneously.  The only evidence indicating their beginnings and progress 
survive through correspondence between Confederate commanders and shipbuilders charged 
with their completion.  Some contracts for the ships built in Elizabeth City and a few payment 
vouchers for vessels to be built in Washington survive.180   The naval officials, officers, and 
shipbuilders include Stephen Mallory, William Williamson, John L. Porter, Arthur Sinclair, and 
Gilbert Elliott. 
Secretary Mallory, Chief Naval Constructor Porter, and Engineer in Chief Williamson 
were ultimately responsible for the North Carolina vessels as they directed operations from 
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Richmond and Norfolk.  Arthur Sinclair was a veteran naval officer, serving many years in the 
United States Navy before obtaining a Confederate commission.  Sinclair served in North 
Carolina waters and at the Gosport Navy Yard in 1861 and early 1862 before being transferred to 
New Orleans.  Before going to New Orleans, Sinclair oversaw construction of three wooden 
gunboats in Washington.181   
Gilbert Elliott was an Elizabeth City native.  Trained in law, he was employed by 
William F. Martin, a local Elizabeth City lawyer, in his legal practice and also managed his 
shipyard.  As the Civil War became a reality, Elliott became the recognized agent for Adjutant 
General James G. Martin.  In this capacity, Elliott assumed responsibility for William F. Martin’s 
shipyard.  William was James’s younger brother.  Elliott eventually claimed fame as a contractor 
of the ironclad CSS Albemarle, completed in 1864.  During the Confederate States Navy’s first 
phase, Elliott learned the shipbuilding business working on wooden gunboats for Martin’s 
firm.182  Contracts for four wooden gunboats were drawn up to be built, with Elliott’s help, in 
Elizabeth City.183 
Captain William F. Lynch commanded naval forces operating in North Carolina waters 
as construction on these seven gunboat began.  Lynch took command following the loss of 
Hatteras Inlet.  In addition to losing the inlet, Samuel Barron, first commander of North Carolina 
waters, was captured by Union forces.  Lynch took control and quickly realized the vulnerability 
of North Carolina’s coast.184  Lynch, along with North Carolina Governor Henry T. Clark, 
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complained of insufficient troop numbers, limited artillery, and non-existent naval forces 
available to properly defend the coast.185    
As Governor Clark and military leaders pushed for more resources in North Carolina, 
shipbuilders in Washington and Elizabeth City began exploring the possibility of Confederate 
vessel construction.  Gilbert Elliott, local shipbuilding agent in Elizabeth City, was already 
quietly communicating with General Martin concerning his shipyard’s potential activities.  
Martin wanted to know if his young associate had the capacity to build ships on schedule for the 
Confederacy.  Martin was in contact with Com. Sinclair in Norfolk, expressing Elizabeth City’s 
ability to build gunboats.186  Though advocating the potential for shipbuilding at his yard under 
Elliott’s direction, Martin was leery of taking on such a project.  Martin, along with Elliott, was 
aware of the difficulties in obtaining marine engines and did not want to get locked into a project 
destined to remain incomplete.  Instead, he moved slowly, wanting to obtain a contract for “hull 
only” construction while the government was responsible for the engines.187   
As Elliott and Martin shopped their shipyard and Elizabeth City’s potential, Commander 
Sinclair finalized contracts for gunboats in Washington.  The wooden gunboats built in 
Washington were built by the Ritch and Farrow firm and Myers & Company.188  Myers & Co. 
contracted to build two wooden gunboats on October 5, 1861, for $16,000 a piece.  A week later, 
Ritch and Farrow signed a contract for one $13,200 gunboat.  The three gunboats were scheduled 
for completion by March and May 1862.189  These contracts included no specifications about the 
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gunboats.  Partial payments indicated machinery was to be furnished by the government and that 
capture or disruption by the enemy would not negatively affect the contract. 
As the Washington contracts were signed, Elliott continued communicating with Sinclair 
and Martin about construction in Elizabeth City.  During mid October, Confederate building 
policy changed.  Sinclair wrote Elliott, stating that Confederate naval authorities would only 
accept fully completed vessels ready for service.  He reported: 
I have just received yours of the 13th inst. The Secretary of the Navy has instructed me to 
make no more contracts for gunboats without machinery.  They must be complete, so 
your offer must be for all.  My plan of boat was furnished by Mr. Porter [and] doubtless 
the same will be given you by him.  Please let me hear from you as early as 
practicable.190  
 
With three gunboats already under contract, accompanied by construction in other Confederate 
ports, numerous completed hulls with no machinery would put the Confederate States Navy in a 
difficult position.  Any marine machinery was in short supply, and stripping converted vessels of 
engines for newly constructed ones limited the number of ships able to defend North Carolina’s 
sounds.  Engineless ships would then be relegated to floating batteries.  
 Martin and Elliott’s cautious approach paid off by the end of October 1861.  Capt. Lynch 
and his small “fleet” encountered some success in North Carolina waters by capturing the 
steamer Fanny, loaded with important supplies and armaments.191  After that success, Elliott was 
summoned to the CSS Sea Bird, Capt. Lynch’s flagship.  At the meeting, Elliott and Martin were 
able to secure a contract for a Confederate gunboat.  The specifications called for a 130 ft. long 
vessel with a 25 ft. beam and a 7 ft. depth of hold. Similar to contracts drawn up for the 
Washington vessels, Elliott would be protected from enemy interruption and not be required to 
return additional funds.  Based upon specifications, the gunboat fit within the Chattahoochee 
                                                 
190
 Sinclair to Elliott, Oct. 15, 1861, Martin Papers. 
191
 Taylor to Lynch, Oct. 8, 1861, ORN ser. 1 vol. 8, 737-378. 
  
66 
 
class of Porter gunboats.192  The steamer Empire’s engines would be bought, removed, and used 
aboard the yet to be constructed gunboat.193   
 As the fall pushed towards winter, prospects for more gunboat construction in Elizabeth 
City increased.  In November 1861, Williamson, Elliott, and Porter were in constant 
communication about building and fitting out more wooden gunboats in North Carolina waters.  
Williamson informed Elliott of the potential of increased shipbuilding activity.  Specifications 
called for vessels of 100 to 120 ft. in length with a beam of around 26 ft. which would mount two 
guns. The “large” number of boats Williamson referenced was Maury’s wooden gunboat fleet.194 
As 1861 turned to 1862, Elliott found himself on the cusp of contracting to build more warships.  
By January 6, 1862, Elliott agreed to build three more gunboats for the Confederate States Navy 
within four months.  At the time, he was building Capt. Lynch’s Chattahoochee class vessel and 
another unclaimed hull sat on the stocks.195 
Deciphering precise specifications for the Washington gunboats by the Myers and Ritch 
and Farrow firms is difficult.  No plans, detailed specifications, or drawings concerning the 
vessels survive.  Cross referencing communications between Elliott, Williamson, Porter, and 
Mallory, coupled with analysis of other ships built under similar circumstances, offer clues.  
After receiving the contract for his first Elizabeth City vessel (at 130 ft. in length), Elliott was 
sent specifications for the Washington gunboats by Constructor Porter.  Porter indicated that 
Elliott would need to take out a 20 foot section to fit his specifications to reach 130 feet for his 
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Elizabeth City gunboat.  A twenty foot decrease indicates a 150 ft. gunboat, of the Macon-class, 
the largest class of the John L. Porter wooden gunboats.196  The boat built by Farrow’s firm cost 
$2,800 less than the Myers built gunboats.  Later in the war, United States Navy Commander 
Stephen Rowan reported that the Farrow hull was smaller than the Myers hulls.197  
Problems for Gunboat Construction 
The problem Stephen Mallory faced in establishing Confederate shipbuilding in North 
Carolina was primarily caused by strategic concerns beyond his control.  While possessing 
shipyards, some needed infrastructure, and a few skilled workers, North Carolina’s northern 
sounds were not as developed as Wilmington or Norfolk. Despite the long tradition of naval 
stores production and maritime trade, Elizabeth City and Washington were more isolated than 
other shipbuilding centers.  The Dismal Swamp and the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canals were 
the only direct, reliable distribution avenues for marine machinery, ordnance, and military 
supplies. 
There were no direct rail connections with Washington and Elizabeth City.  The only 
railway extending to the North Carolina coast besides the Wilmington and Weldon was the 
Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad.  This railway went between Beaufort and New Bern and 
then towards Kinston.198  The South’s shipbuilding establishment was still scattered, with needed 
auxiliary industries located in different regions.  Building ships in Washington and Elizabeth 
City required support from industries located in other Confederate states.   
Securing suitable engines for the Washington and Elizabeth City gunboats proved 
difficult.  Contracts for the Washington wooden gunboats were made first, nearly two weeks 
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before the meeting between Captain Lynch and Elliott on board the CSS Sea Bird.  These 
gunboats were given precedent over the Elizabeth City vessel based on references to some 
contracts.  The Talbott Brothers, owners of the Shockoe Foundry in Richmond, agreed to build 
six marine engines for the three Washington gunboats, although no specific contract has been 
located.199   
Elliott had been promised the Empire’s engines by Capt. Lynch, but Porter indicated the 
vessel’s engines could not be used after an investigation by Williamson.  Troubled by this 
development, Elliott appealed to Norfolk and Richmond, hoping to find some good news.  The 
Talbott Brothers had no engines on hand.  The only machinery able to power a vessel with a six 
or seven foot propeller shaft was in New Orleans.200  To complete Lynch’s vessel, Elliott was 
dependent upon the Confederate transportation system.  Numerous stops would be made if 
shipped by rail.  Complete transportation by water was not an option because of Union naval 
forces. There was no certainty that the engines could be secured and, with a $6,000 price tag, 
Elliott had little money to spend.  Hope for those engines making it all the way to Elizabeth City 
was questionable.  
 Securing steam engines was just one of many problems Elliott encountered.  The young 
contractor knew of the deficient manufacturing capabilities, but also contended with timber and 
other material shortages.  Between October and December, letters indicated Elliott’s problems.  
Limited iron resources and disappearing shipments of timber were just some of the headaches 
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Elliott experienced.201  Iron Foundries, like George Reid and Phillips & Co. of Norfolk and 
Tredegar, constantly reported scarce supplies and low production.202  
 The scarcity of iron was accompanied by frustration attempting to secure quality timber, 
both oak and yellow pine.  In Columbia, North Carolina, James N. Perry was a local lumberman 
with an established relationship with Martin and Elliott.203  As early as September 1861, Perry 
was cutting timber, hoping to sell it in Norfolk.204  Others, including L. Hinds of Camden 
County, William R. Abbott of South Mills, J.J. Jordan of Winton, and E. L. Dozier of Camden, 
also had existing relationships supplying Martin’s shipyard.  The most useful of these sawmill 
owners and woodsmen to Elliott were Jordan and Hinds.205  Hinds wrote Elliott, explaining the 
progress of his timber cutting and digging operations.  The timber Elliott needed was soon to be 
in route.  The supplies were welcome, but a promised partial $5,000 payment for Lynch’s vessel 
was the best part.206  Shortly after, Mallory and Elliott agreed to build three more Confederate 
gunboats.   
 As activities progressed in Elizabeth City, the gunboats in Washington also moved 
forward.  Along with hull construction, arrangements were made to supply engines and boilers 
for three Porter gunboats.207  Aside from references by Williamson and officials associated with 
Shockoe Foundry in Richmond, specific details for these three vessels are scarce.  The only other 
clues are partial payments received by the companies and their contracts.  As the original Myers’ 
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contract stated, incremental payments would be made based upon continued progress. The 
contract stated that a keel must be finished, the hull framed, and then planked.208   Three total 
payments were made by March 1862.  The Ritch and Farrow gunboat appeared to have not 
gotten much farther.209 
 Obtaining proper ordnance and projectiles was another problem for shipbuilders in 
Washington and Elizabeth City.  Although 1,100 pieces of heavy artillery had been captured 
when the Union evacuated Norfolk, only 80 found their way to North Carolina, and went to 
shore batteries and other forts.210   Even with the Norfolk guns, General D. H. Hill’s October 
1861 assessment described a porous coastal defensive network.  He pointed to limited 
ammunition available for guns protecting New Bern, too few guns at Fort Macon, inferior guns 
guarding Washington, and the want of proper armament in Hyde County.  Those problems 
notwithstanding, Hill appealed to Secretary Mallory about his most pressing concern.  He 
reported:  
Roanoke Island is the key to one-third of North Carolina, and its possession by the enemy 
would enable him to seize the great railway connection between north and south of the 
Confederacy.  This all important island is in want of men and guns.  It should have six 
more rifled cannon.211  
 
  Mallory could do nothing but appeal to the Secretary of War for guns and ammunition 
because he possessed none.212  Tredegar, one of two Confederate facilities that could produce 
heavy cannon, only produced 45 artillery pieces by October 1, 1861.213  By early winter 1862, 
the artillery situation remained problematic at best.  Josiah Gorgas explained, “The winter of 
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1861 and 1862 was the darkest period of my department…Heavy guns…were called in all 
directions-the largest guns for the smallest places.”214  The manufacturing capabilities and 
artillery secured at Norfolk could not keep up with demand.  If shore based installations received 
insufficient artillery and ammunition, the navy had worse prospects.   
The Burnside Expedition 
 The seven gunboats under contract in North Carolina during early 1862 had a limited life 
expectancy.  During previous weeks and months, an amphibious expedition was organized under 
the dual command of Union General Ambrose Burnside and Admiral Louis Goldsborough.  
Their aim was complete control over North Carolina’s sounds and, by extension, the railroads on 
North Carolina’s coastal plain.  Calls were made as early as September 1861 for a follow up 
assault to bolster the newly acquired Union position on Hatteras Island.215  
 These calls were answered by Burnside’s expedition.  This amphibious assault began 
during the early morning of February 7, 1862.  To reach their strategic goals, eastern North 
Carolina’s capitulation and control of its railways, Burnside and Goldsborough’s combined force 
needed to accomplish two objectives.  First, they must neutralize the Confederate land based 
fortifications covering Roanoke Island and adjacent Croatan Sound. Goldsborough’s fleet was 
then to destroy Capt. Lynch’s “Mosquito Fleet” protecting Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds.   
 These objectives were achieved over a three day period.  The combined army and navy 
units landed smoothly and quickly neutralized Confederate defenders on Roanoke Island.216  
Roanoke Island surrendered to Union forces the evening of February 8.  Goldsborough 
regrouped, and, under command of Commander Stephen Rowan, part of the Union fleet steamed 
north toward Capt. Lynch’s Confederate naval flotilla. On February 10, 1862, Rowan cornered 
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the Confederates at Elizabeth City and destroyed them.  Both Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds 
had been captured within a three day period.  The seven Confederate gunboats would not be 
finished.   
 After the rout at Elizabeth City, Gilbert Elliott’s shipbuilding activities in his hometown 
were over. A Chattahoochee class vessel under construction was never completed.217  The 
Burnside Expedition did not stop there.  A little over a month passed before Fort Macon, New 
Bern, and Morehead City came under Union control.218  Union naval forces then steamed up 
Pamlico River and captured Washington, North Carolina., ending construction of the three Porter 
gunboats.  The Farrow vessel was burned on the stocks while the Myers boat was towed 
upstream before being scuttled by the Confederate defenders to prevent capture. Sufficient 
progress was never made on the contract for the second Myers gunboat.219 
Conclusion 
 The Burnside Expedition brought an abrupt end to wooden gunboat construction in 
northeastern North Carolina.  The gunboats in Washington and Elizabeth City, despite the best 
efforts of ship carpenters and Confederate officials, were never finished.  Shipbuilding was held 
back by geographic limitations posed by rivers and sounds that limited the local manufacturing, 
transportation, and communication. 
Marine machinery production was only possible in the few more urbanized areas like 
Norfolk, Richmond, New Orleans, and Columbus.  Confederate ordnance production early in the 
conflict could not keep up with the combined needs of the Confederate army and navy.  Ironclad 
warships, the most important cities and ports, and under equipped army units would receive most 
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manufactures and artillery.  Wooden gunboats, especially those waiting for machinery and 
engines, had to wait as wartime stimuli necessitated allocation of precious resources to the most 
urgent areas.   
Union occupation of the northeastern sounds did not signify the end of construction in 
North Carolina.  Shipbuilding operations shifted south to North Carolina’s largest city and port, 
Wilmington, and inland, along three other rivers.  Both ironclad and wooden gunboats would be 
built there until early 1865.  Confederate vessel construction continued in northeastern North 
Carolina as well.  Two ironclads were successfully completed, the CSS Albemarle near Halifax, 
and the CSS Neuse near Kinston. These locations were located up river from Washington and 
Elizabeth City.  Similar to North Carolina, South Carolina also saw increased shipbuilding after 
Confederate reorganization in mid 1862.  The Confederate States Navy continued wooden 
gunboat construction at an interior facility near Florence until 1865. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Second Phase, CSS Peedee and Mars Bluff 
 South Carolina was an important part of Confederate States Navy shipbuilding.  In 
actuality, the Confederate States Navy owes its beginnings to the first state to secede from the 
Union.  Upon secession, South Carolina organized a state navy for defensive purposes against 
the United States.  It contributed shipyards and considerable resources during each phase of 
Confederate shipbuilding.   Both ironclad and wooden vessels were constructed in the Palmetto 
State. Charleston was an obvious construction location as one of the oldest and most important 
Confederate ports.  It built and refitted Confederate vessels almost throughout the war.  In 
addition to shipbuilding activities, blockade runners regularly used Charleston to smuggle 
needed supplies into the Confederacy, especially during the Civil War’s first two years.   
Charleston’s importance notwithstanding, another location was the site of a Confederate 
States Navy Yard in South Carolina.  Mars Bluff, situated close to Florence on the Great Pee Dee 
River, was the other Confederate shipbuilding site in South Carolina.  The Mars Bluff Navy 
Yard was established as a part of Stephen Mallory’s reorganization of Confederate shipbuilding 
and manufacturing facilities during mid-1862.  At this site, what is believed to be a Macon-Class 
wooden gunboat, CSS Peedee, was completed during the Civil War’s second half.  
Initiated in early 1863, the CSS Peedee was not completed, commissioned, and put into 
active service for nearly two years.  Confederate inadequacies in mass transportation, 
manufacturing capability, and maintaining enough supplies created a strained logistical 
framework that station commanders Lt. Van R. Morgan and, later, Lt. Edward J. Means, along 
with Naval Constructor E. C. Murray and other personnel dealt with on a daily basis.220  That the 
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CSS Peedee was ever completed despite the limitations and Secretary Mallory’s preference for 
ironclad construction after 1862 is remarkable.  
Charleston, South Carolina 
The history and economy of South Carolina was closely associated with agriculture and 
maritime commerce.  From its early history as a British colony until the Civil War, cultivation of 
rice, cotton, and the production of naval stores and lumber were important components of South 
Carolina’s economy.  Charleston was the industrial and manufacturing center for this largely 
agrarian state.  It evolved into a diversified urban center supporting a variety of industries and 
economic interests including iron foundries, sawmills, and railcar production capabilities.  
Although the scale of this diversification was small in comparison to the more urban north, 
Charleston ranked third in southern manufactures behind Richmond and New Orleans.  A yearly 
total of $2,750,000 worth of manufactures was produced in Charleston by 1850.  That number 
increased to its peak of $3,000,000 in 1856.221 
Within Charleston’s diversified economy, elements of heavy industry were present.  With 
an industrial and manufacturing presence, a vibrant shipbuilding sector existed.  As many as five 
shipyards with around 160 white and black mechanics operated during the 1840’s.222  Numerous 
sailing, steam, and smaller boats were constructed along with three dry docks.  On the eve of the 
Civil War, economic conditions and several fires during preceding years suppressed economic 
growth as a whole in Charleston, including shipbuilding.  An 1860 local survey indicated four 
firms engaged in ship construction and repair work.223 
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Secretary Mallory wished to use the manufacturing and industrial capabilities in 
Charleston for the Confederate States Navy.  Captain Duncan Ingraham took command of navy 
construction in Charleston in November 1861.  Early in 1862, Ingraham expanded construction 
operations.  Charleston residents had legitimate concerns about a possible amphibious landing by 
the Union.  Just before Ingraham took command of rebel naval forces in South Carolina, an 
expedition led by Admiral Samuel F. DuPont, captured Port Royal, just south of Charleston.224  
Consequently, and despite Mallory’s reservations concerning dwindling resources, Ingraham 
secured permission to build the CSS Chicora, as well as the CSS Palmetto State.225  These two 
ironclad vessels became the Confederate States Navy’s backbone in Charleston Harbor.   
Establishment of the Mars Bluff Navy Yard 
During the spring and summer of 1862, construction in Charleston continued as the 
Confederates bolstered defenses in several important Confederate ports and cities.  Union thrusts 
into Confederate territory on each side of the Confederacy and a strengthening blockade 
necessitated these changes.  As important points along the coast were reinforced, Mallory moved 
manufacturing and shipbuilding locations into the interior to protect them from coastal raids.  
The Confederate States Navy Yard at Mars Bluff was one of these inland locations.  It was deep 
enough in South Carolina’s interior to shield it from possible Union raiding parties.226 
The beginning of the Mars Bluff Navy Yard was documented in letters exchanged 
between Lt. Alfonse Barbot and Capt. Ingraham in November 1862.  Barbot was ordered to 
Chesterfield County, near Cheraw, South Carolina, to scout the area for a suitable shipyard 
location on the Pee Dee River.227  Barbot may have found the site and made the 
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recommendation, but he did not establish the yard.  In December 1862, Mallory ordered Lt. 
William Dozier to Mars Bluff to begin organizing shipbuilding.  Reaching Mars Bluff, Dozier 
made contact with William W. Harllee who helped gather materials.228  In addition to the 
Lieutenant, a paymaster was sent with $10,000 to begin gunboat construction.229 
The Navy Yard’s site was located on private property leased by the Confederate 
government.  That property had been owned by two brothers, Nathan and Knight Gibson, who 
inherited the land from their father James Gibson.  When James died in 1854, and before 
dividing the land between his two sons, he was one of the wealthier planters in the area.  His 
holdings included slaves valued at $119,032, and 10,000 acres of farmland.  In addition to 
plantation land adjacent to the river, James Gibson owned a home in Darlington with seven 
additional slaves.230 
The Gibson family continued farming their land until the beginning of the Civil War.  
During this time, the land was slowly partitioned between other individuals.  “Bird’s Landing,” 
owned by Joseph Bird, was the site of the Confederate States Navy’s official lease; however, the 
lease is unclear.  The lease states that the land to be used is the “turn of the River to Bird’s 
Landing.”  The specific location, north or south of Bird’s Landing, is not specifically stated.  A 
total of ten acres was leased to the Confederacy for one year for $200.  On March 16, 1863, the 
agreement was signed between Lt. Dozier, Capt. S. Thomson, and Joseph Bird.  The lease was 
retroactively dated to January 1863.  The lease stipulated that structures and gunboats were to be 
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built at the location for the Confederate government’s use.231  Although the lease only made 
arrangements for one year, Confederate authorities operated the shipyard until its destruction in 
March 1865.232  The lease could have very easily been extended to support continuing gunboat 
construction, yet those specific documents and communications have not been located.   
Regional Infrastructure and Commerce 
 The position of the Mars Bluff Navy Yard did not occur by accident.  Strategically and 
logistically, this was an important location.  The navigable portion on the Pee Dee River beyond 
potential Union amphibious incursions was only part of the equation.  Equally important as 
navigable waters and inland protection was the railroad running through Marion County, near the 
Mars Bluff site.  This was the Wilmington and Manchester line which connected Wilmington, 
North Carolina, with Columbia, South Carolina.  Located about halfway between the two cities 
was Florence, southwest of Mars Bluff.   
Florence was important because the Wilmington and Manchester railroad connected with 
the Northwestern Railroad, which extended to Charleston.  The two railroads connected Mars 
Bluff with the Charleston and Wilmington Naval Stations and, by extension via the Wilmington 
and Weldon Railroad, with Petersburg and Richmond.  The Confederate Powder Works, located 
in Columbia, also connected directly with Mars Bluff.233  Columbia and Charlotte were 
connected, offering Mars Bluff a tie to the Charlotte Navy Yard.  
The rail connections with interior and coastal navy stations were important for a number 
of reasons.  First, Mars Bluff accessed lumber and raw timber needed in other areas.  Second, 
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meetings and rail travel by Confederate construction officers and station commanders was 
essential for vessels to be completed.   Thirdly, shipments of artillery and ordnance supplies, 
together with machinery and general supplies, moved more swiftly along rail lines than by 
wagon, horseback, or by foot.  While transportation of materials was preferred on railroads, 
shipments occurred by any means necessary. 
The area surrounding Mars Bluff Navy Yard was a producer of agricultural products.  
Rice was the major crop, chiefly cultivated on smaller farms.  Closer to the coast, on the 
Georgetown side of the Pee Dee River, larger plantations produced bulk crops.  The Pee Dee 
River carried a large portion of the crop yields to and from local markets.  Aiding the river’s 
commercial appeal were a series of public work projects during the 1820’s.  From 1823 through 
1825, $21,000 was spent on improving the Pee Dee’s navigation.234  Rafts, pole boats, and a few 
steamboats ferried products up and down the river.  Local newspapers kept citizens updated 
concerning boats, cargoes, and owners transporting goods on the Pee Dee. One company, the 
Merchants and Planters Steamboat Company of Cheraw, operated a number of pole boats and the 
steamer Osceola.235   
 Augmenting the agricultural economy in northeastern South Carolina was the naval 
stores and lumber industry.  The naval stores industry followed construction of railways into 
northeastern South Carolina during the 1840’s and 1850’s.  The railroads extended the reach of 
naval stores production farther from the riverbanks.  Quick transportation of naval stores and the 
abundant lumber close to rivers helped the industry grow.  While North Carolina was the leader 
of naval stores production during the antebellum period, by 1860, South Carolina produced the 
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second most turpentine, an important naval store, worth $1,096,974.236  The forests also yielded 
fresh timber for export.  In 1847, three sawmills operated in Georgetown.  After timber was 
gathered farther up river, it was loaded on flatboats and shipped downriver to Georgetown for 
shipment to other markets.  The increasing naval stores and lumber production helped swell river 
based traffic and commerce.237    
The commercial importance of the Pee Dee River in decades preceding the Civil War was 
impacted by the introduction of lumbering and naval stores production coupled with the 
improvements made to the Pee Dee River’s navigation during the 1820’s.238  The railroad 
represented Marion County’s and, by extension, Mars Bluff’s connection with other ports and 
commercial centers in the Confederacy.  The direct connection with other cities by railroads was 
of great importance to Confederate commanders choosing inland locations.  Not only could 
wooden gunboat construction at Mars Bluff benefit from ties to manufacturing centers and 
Confederate naval establishments, but it could help construction efforts in other locations.   
The timber resources and lumbering industry in Marion County helped other stations 
construct vessels.  Confederate vessel construction in Wilmington was tied to operations at Mars 
Bluff.  There were numerous lumber shipments to Wilmington from Marion County.  Mallory 
stated, “This station has been of much use lately in filling requisitions for timber for the new 
steamer at Wilmington.”239  Shipments of lumber to Wilmington continued until January 1865, 
just before the port’s capitulation.  Hindering these shipments were insufficient numbers of rail 
cars available to transport the materials.240 
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In addition to connecting yards, railroads allowed central oversight of vessel 
construction.  Both Chief Naval Constructor Porter and Chief Engineer Williamson traveled 
extensively.  During the course of the war, each man visited navy yards throughout the 
Confederacy, amending designs or correcting flaws while advocating timely construction.  Porter 
regularly traveled back and forth between naval stations and Richmond, usually by rail.241  
Williamson also traveled extensively throughout the Confederacy, visiting Georgia, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, inspecting machinery planned for Confederate vessels.242 
Porter and Williamson were not the only ones to travel extensively by rail.  Mars Bluff 
Navy Yard personnel also traveled regularly, meeting with officers and constructors at other 
stations.  Station commanders Morgan and Means often traveled, lobbying for supplies or to 
secure skilled workers for Mars Bluff.243  Swift communication and coordination of construction 
was critically important to Mallory’s department.  Any alteration in ship design based upon local 
geographic conditions, or material and supply shortages, needed to be quickly approved by 
Confederate naval constructors and engineers.  Southern railways represented an important 
conduit in keeping construction of navy vessels going. 
Shipments of artillery, machinery, and general supplies traveled on rails into Mars Bluff.  
Freight from Charleston, Effingham, and Florence, including sawmills, grist mills, and stoves 
moved on the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad.244  Two flat boats were purchased to 
increase the flow.245  The transportation improvements undertaken in the decades before the 
Civil War contributed to these successful movements.  
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Problems Maintaining Appropriations and Supplies 
Despite the strategic and logistical placement of Mars Bluff, a one year project turned 
into a two year attempt to overcome shortages and delays.  Railroads and improved river 
transportation could not solve all the logistical problems.  Limited ordnance stores, ship 
machinery, general provisions, and securing skilled labor regularly disrupted construction 
schedules.  Contributing to those problems were Union army movements that disrupted supply 
lines, displaced other interior facilities, and threatened Mars Bluff Navy Yard itself.   
Upon Lt. Dozier’s arrival in Marion County, efforts were made to procure materials.  As 
suggested by Mallory’s orders in December, W. W. Harllee was contacted and helped secure 
needed materials.  Robert Harllee also furnished victuals, tools, and some building materials.246  
Robert F. W. Allston, former Governor of South Carolina, furnished two flat boats.  A wealthy 
planter in nearby Georgetown County, Allston contributed substantial capital to the Mars bluff 
yard throughout the CSS Peedee’s construction.247 At one time, Lt. Dozier bought $392 worth of 
food for the yard from another local source.248  Bricks and other building materials and tools 
were also purchased during the first weeks to construct structures at the shipyard.249    
After operations commenced, Lt. Dozier was recalled to Charleston and Lt. Van R. 
Morgan took over the yard.250  Morgan continued construction of the CSS Peedee.  Soon after 
Morgan assumed duty, Naval Constructor E. C. Murray returned from Mobile, Alabama, with 
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building supplies including saw blades and iron.251  Accompanying Murray’s purchases was 
more than 32,000 feet of pitched timber.252 
As supplies were secured and building materials brought in, Confederate authorities hired 
laborers and carpenters.  Both free and slave labor was used during the yard’s operation.  Within 
Marion County, there were 32 carpenters, 15 coopers, 11, blacksmiths, 3 engineers, 5 turpentine 
tamers, 2 turpentine distillers, and 5 painters listed as construction and naval stores related 
professionals.  Some 29 merchants lived and worked in Marion County.253  Many local citizens, 
not already enlisted or conscripted into the army, volunteered to work at the yard.  J. F. Finger 
and William Evans, both carpenters, worked at Mars Bluff as late as October 1864.254  
Contributing to the operation were numerous slaves.  As many as eleven different 
plantation owners contributed skilled and unskilled workers.  Many carpenters working at the 
Navy Yard were black, both free and slave.255  Free and slave labor contributed considerable 
time and energy to the yard and the CSS Peedee.   
With activities at the yard underway, the first problems were encountered by Confederate 
authorities.  Correspondence between Secretary Mallory and station officers indicates 
appropriations to the yard appeared to have run out by late April 1863.256   This same letter 
shows little was accomplished because the same request for $10,000 was again made in June 
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1863.  Requests for funds went up to $20,000 the following month.257   Trouble obtaining regular 
appropriations did not stop construction activities, but certainly complicated them.  Securing 
funds was a problem the Mars Bluff Yard and its leadership dealt with throughout its operation.   
The Confederate Treasury Department had problems obtaining money needed to fund 
both the War and Navy Departments.  Marion County citizens and businesses did more than 
simply supply needed labor and materials, but they also needed funds.  Ladies donated their 
jewelry to help the fund shipyard.  Historian Leah Townsend recalled statements of James 
Rogers in a local Florence newspaper: 
Mr. James Rogers wrote…that the construction of the gunboat “Peedee” was a 
community project, largely financed by contributions from [businessmen], slave labor 
from plantation owners, and collections of jewelry and silver plate by the ladies…He 
mentions two aunts of J. M. Napier, of Darlington, from whom this tradition probably 
came.  It is borne out of an undated letter, written probably in 1925, by Louise Harllee 
Pearce to her great-granddaughter Louise Wallace (Salligen), stating that the money for 
the boat came partly from the sale of their jewelry by the ladies of the region, and that 
they called it “our” boat.258 
 
As the local community rallied around the vessel’s construction, the station became a symbol of 
pride for residents.  Picnics and dances were said to have taken place on board the vessel and in 
the navy yard.  The community effort represented a multi-regional movement as other 
Confederate towns raised money, for both wooden and ironclad gunboats.259 
 When Secretary Mallory gave his second annual report he indicated that “one seagoing 
steam gunboat of 5 guns advancing towards completion, machinery ready.” This was the gunboat 
under construction at Mars Bluff during 1863.  Mallory indicated insufficient skilled labor and 
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mechanics at all Confederate yards.260  Those stated limitations did not prevent the Confederates 
from expanding operations at Mars Bluff.  By the next report in April 1864, the CSS Peedee had 
its propellers and engines installed awaiting its full armament. Alongside the gunboat was a 
partially built tender and torpedo boat, just underway.261    
Construction at the yard appears to demonstrate smooth operations.  In actuality, the 
report given by Secretary Mallory is misleading, stating that the ship already mounted a battery 
of five guns.  The CSS Peedee eventually mounted three heavy guns; but the rifled artillery 
destined for the gunboat had yet to arrive.262  The engines provided for the gunboat did not 
perform at their highest level because they were designed for a smaller vessel, perhaps originally 
meant for a Maury gunboat.  As 1864 turned to fall, the command at Mars Bluff changed.  Lt. 
Morgan was reassigned and Lt. Edward J. Means took over.  Means’ correspondence provides a 
detailed look at the difficulties he and, Lt. Morgan faced.   
CSS Peedee Moves Towards Completion 
After relinquishing command in July, Morgan set the final stages of CSS Peedee’s 
construction in motion.  Reports of late 1863 and early 1864 were accurate when depicting the 
ship’s exterior construction.  The problems Means experienced getting a completed gunboat 
combat ready originated in Selma, Alabama.  The Selma Gun foundry and Naval Ordnance 
Works was well into its second year.  Two rifled Brooke guns would be mounted on the CSS 
Peedee; their journey from central Alabama to northeastern South Carolina became more than a 
two month odyssey. 
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The journey of the Brooke guns began in July 1864.  Com. Jones, commandant of Selma 
Gun Foundry and Ordnance Works, wrote Lt. McLaughlin of the impending transfer of guns by 
way of Montgomery and Columbus, Georgia.263  Com. Jones also sent word to Lt. Morgan that 
the 6.4 inch and 7 inch rifled guns were on the way and indicated the personnel responsible for 
ensuring delivery.  The guns had not left Montgomery on July 26.264   Weeks later, the guns were 
still in Montgomery as the railroad to Columbus was not in service.  Transportation would not 
occur without direct orders from Richmond.265  Union army movements were becoming 
increasingly disruptive to transportation efforts.266  The other large ordnance piece, the nine-inch 
Dahlgren, was originally produced at the Fort Pitt Foundry in mid-1862.  Determining its 
specific path to Mars Bluff remains a mystery.267 
Meanwhile, in Mars Bluff, Lt. Means assumed command.  The CSS Peedee inched 
towards completion as the masts and rigging were erected and put in working order.  Lt. Means 
received word that the cannon had been shipped from Augusta on September 8.268  In the same 
letter, Means stated the problems that the CSS Peedee faced.  Despite positive word of the guns’ 
arrival, they had not actually shown up.  Ordnance stores were believed to be in Kingsville, 
South Carolina and the gun carriages were not in Mars Bluff.  Even though the wooden gunboat 
was still waiting for its armament, Means indicated that the vessel was ready for a crew.269   
Waiting for ordnance stores and rifled guns to show up was but one difficulty Lt. Means 
faced in his first weeks.  Problems arose with the galley and some machinery on board.  Means 
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stated that some needed supplies were in Charlotte.270  Complicating galley repairs was an 
October directive from Secretary Mallory and Constructor Porter concerning wooden water 
tanks.  Lt. Means reported that Constructor Porter was needed at the yard to oversee the 
alterations.271  Other changes were needed to the one-inch “pivots” on the IX-inch carriage for 
the Dahlgren gun.  Alterations to the positioning of the guns and repairs to the galley were only a 
symptom.  Changes made to the gun chassis resulted in moving hatches, for moving the one-inch 
pivot for the howitzers.  Porter inspected the vessel personally and made the recommendation.272  
Alterations and changes to the CSS Peedee was one problem Means faced.   
Lt. Means indicated an influx of 80 men arrived from Charleston on Sept. 26.273  The 
men who worked the yard and the sailors training to operate the steamer had to be fed and 
clothed.  Maintaining a steady supply of food remained a priority.  Continued purchases from 
local sources continued until the end of the year.  Before Means’ arrival, Lt. Morgan successfully 
procured food, including 200 pounds of bacon, 75 bushels of corn, and 50 bushels of beans 
between April and July 1864.274  One of Morgan’s purchasing agents, Charles Haseldon, helped 
secure many supplies.  When Means took over, he wanted to maintain Hasledon’s services, but 
the agent had been conscripted into the Confederate army.  Means advocated Haseldon’s release 
from army duty to continue securing food and supplies by explaining the purchasing agent’s 
family connections.  Attempting to offset Mr. Haseldon’s reassignment, Means tried obtaining 
food through the local commissary department with no luck.  That department struggled to feed 
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its own personnel as well.275  Even though Means was successful in regaining Mr. Haselden’s 
services, it did not work out in the end because he deserted in January 1865.276 
Keeping the station fed was just one supply problem encountered; another revolved 
around obtaining shoes for the workers.  This task was especially desperate for the slaves.  Lt. 
Means wrote to a Mr. Sparkman on November 4, 1864 expressing his concerns: 
There are hired to the Navy Yard several negroes belonging to Col. B. Allston…many of 
which are in want of shoes and some in want of clothing.  I do not know where to apply 
or from whom to procure the needed articles and as all these necessities are so very high I 
do not feel warranted in going it blind…If they do not get something soon they will 
suffer.  Some of those in want of shoes are getting timber in the swamp and it is 
necessary they should have shoes.277 
 
Word of the shortcomings made its way to Colonel Benjamin Allston’s residency, hence Means 
appealed to Mrs. Allston, Col. Allston’s mother, in Georgetown directly.278  She had written the 
Lieutenant concerning shoes a few weeks before, simply stating that her son “would wish them 
provided.”279   
 The shoe shortage explained Means’s interest in retaining the services of B. W. Jernigan.  
Jernigan was the only shoemaker within ten miles, but he had been conscripted to join the army.  
Means felt that his presence was a necessity for continued operations.  Means cited the 
unavailability of any other shoemakers, the man’s older age, and his willingness to work for 
minuscule wages.280  It is unclear if Lt. Means secured Jernigan’s services.  The Lieutenant wrote 
the Allston residence a few weeks later, asserting the need for more shoes, and suggesting such 
requests went unfulfilled.    
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While finishing the CSS Peedee, Means still had two other vessels under construction.  A 
steam tender and torpedo boat sat unfinished.  Securing engines and boilers was a challenge.  
The Union army’s “March to the Sea” through Georgia disrupted movement of machinery.  In 
December, engines intended for the tender sat in Columbus.281  The torpedo boat had no engines 
assigned. Means wrote Mallory that some engines were in Georgetown on board the blockade 
runner Steamer Carolina.  He suggested transporting the engines to Mars bluff using the 
railroad.282  Lt. Means sent Assistant Paymaster William Deacon to Georgetown to bring engines 
back to Mars Bluff.  In addition to the engines, stoves also were to be impressed for use at Mars 
Bluff.283 
The Florence Stockade 
A few miles southwest of Mars Bluff a large prison facility operated near Florence.  A 
report written on October 12, 1864 indicated 12,362 prisoners were housed just miles from Mars 
Bluff.284  Some prisoners escaped while others were given paroles.  Correspondence between 
Means, Mallory, and Capt. S. S. Lee demonstrated the concern officers at Mars Bluff had with 
the proximity of the stockade.  Means reported limited manpower available to deal with escaped 
Union prisoners.  There were only five companies of soldiers defending the area stretching east 
to the coast and north to the North Carolina state line.  To better secure his position, Means 
drilled his workers despite illness ravaging their ranks.285  Means also ordered Naval Constructor 
Murray to post nightly watches at the yard and railroad bridge.286  Tired, sick, and underfed men 
continued efforts despite increased demands posed by the Florence Stockade.  
                                                 
281
 Means to Mallory, Dec. 21, 1864, Means Papers.   
282
 Means to Mallory, Dec. 6, 1864, Means Papers.   
283
 Means to Deacon, Dec. 6, 1864, RG 45, M-1091, Roll 5, 324; Means to Mallory, Dec. 20, 1864, Means Papers. 
284
 W. D. Pickett to Lt. Gen. Hardee, Oct. 12, 1864, ORA ser. 2 vol. 7, 972-974. 
285
 Means to Mallory, Sept. 17, 1864, Means Papers; Correspondence was also sent to Gen. J. W. Trapier reporting 
the above stated conditions of security against potential escapees (Sept. 17, 1864, Means Papers). 
286
 Means to Murray, Sept. 17, 1864, Means Papers. 
  
90 
 
Final Weeks at the Mars Bluff Ship Yard 
As the calendar turned from 1864 to 1865, the Confederacy was in bad shape.  Union 
army movements through Georgia into South Carolina and North Carolina curtailed operations at 
most coastal and inland Confederate States Navy stations.  Despite realities, Secretary Mallory 
painted a more positive picture concerning his department in early January 1865.  He indicated 
the capacity for continued operations at interior manufacturing facilities with some supplies and 
provisions, but admitted deficiencies in securing skilled and unskilled labor to operate at full 
capacity.287   
At Mars Bluff, Lt. Means continued to push construction forward.  The steam tender and 
torpedo boat still sat on the stocks waiting for engines.  Means reported to Mallory that the 
engines intended for the tender had been captured at Columbus, Georgia.  Those engines were 
still undergoing repairs and, from the deplorable conditions of the railways, transporting them 
would have been virtually impossible.288  The torpedo boat, however, received its engines, which 
arrived January 12.  The CSS Peedee was put into official commission under the command of Lt. 
Oscar F. Johnston.289  The good news concerning acquisition of the torpedo boat’s engines and 
the commissioning of the CSS Peedee was short lived. 
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Figure 5-1. Map of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina Railroads during General Sherman’s “March to the 
Sea” (Source: U.S. National Parks Service). 
 
Lt. Means continued operations in the face of the mounting crisis.  By February 1865, 
Gen. Sherman had captured Columbia.  Means continued gathering supplies and funds for the 
yard’s operations, but circumstances beyond his control foiled his efforts.290  In late February, 
Means reported to Mallory that he was evacuating valuable supplies and machinery north to 
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Cheraw.291  During the evacuation, CSS Peedee completed its one military mission as it covered 
the Confederate retreat across the Pee Dee River at Cheraw.292 
Conclusion 
The men serving at the Mars Bluff Navy Yard did their jobs until the very end.  Despite 
overwhelming logistical limitations in transporting ordnance, machinery, and building materials, 
coupled with labor shortages and limited provisions, the Confederate States Navy completed the 
wooden steamer, CSS Peedee.  It took almost two full years to accomplish. This was completed 
while sidestepping numerous logistical shortcomings at the local, regional, and national levels.  
With military movements in different regions of the Confederacy coinciding with construction 
operations at Mars Bluff, shipyard officers and personnel only had so much control over keeping 
an efficient building schedule up to speed.  An inadequate, interdependent network of 
manufacturing facilities caused great delays in CSS Peedee’s construction.      
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 Chapter 6: Logistics of CSS Peedee’s Heavy Cannon 
 
 Obtaining needed armaments for Confederate vessels was an important aspect of a ship’s 
fitting out.  Without proper ordnance and ammunition, a naval vessel lacks the very instruments 
it needs to wage war against an enemy.  In the Confederacy, securing needed weaponry for 
warships was difficult.  For the wooden gunboats under construction in northeastern North 
Carolina, obtaining armament was problematic because of limited supply and insufficient 
industrial capacity during the war’s first year.  Shore installations and the Confederate army took 
precedence over unfinished wooden gunboats.  Finding ordnance proved a non-issue for naval 
authorities in Washington and Elizabeth City.  Burnside’s Expedition ended wooden gunboat 
construction before specific requests for weaponry were made.   
 A different story unfolded at the Mars Bluff Navy Yard where the CSS Peedee was built.  
Commanders and constructors were able to build, despite numerous obstacles, what is believed 
to be a Macon class wooden gunboat.  Problems securing adequate appropriations from the 
Confederate Treasury were commonplace.  Parts and machinery for systems critical to the CSS 
Peedee’s construction were difficult to find and install as the Civil War’s final year unfolded.  
The above examples are demonstrative of the logistical problems station commanders Lt. Van R. 
Morgan and Lt. E. J. Means experienced.   
Shipping CSS Peedee’s heavy guns to Mars Bluff is the clearest and most specific 
example of the logistical nightmare the officers endured.  Two Brooke rifled cannon, one 6.4 
inch and one 7 inch, coupled with one IX inch Dahlgren served as CSS Peedee’s heavy 
armaments.  The story of their shipment and arrival at Mars Bluff clearly demonstrates 
Confederate logistical shortcomings during the Civil War’s later stages.    
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Brooke Rifled Cannon  
The two Brooke rifled cannon that were mounted on the CSS Peedee had their origins in 
Selma, Alabama.293  At the Selma Naval Gun Foundry and Ordnance Works, the Confederate 
States Navy produced heavy cannon for military use.  Both the army and navy received heavy 
guns from this establishment, commanded by Commandant Catesby ap. R. Jones.294  Between 
July 1863 and December 1864, 75 heavy cannon were sent to the army and navy.295  Shipping 
the two rifled guns to Mars Bluff from Selma was difficult to orchestrate considering the 
precarious transportation situation and Union military advances made into many Southern states.    
There was no direct rail connection between the stations.  Two railroad options existed 
for shipping ordnance from Selma to more eastern Confederate stations.  There was one direct 
railroad in Selma, the Alabama & Tennessee Rivers Railroad, traveling northeast until its 
terminus at Blue Mountain, Alabama.  From there, armaments would travel east towards Atlanta 
over as many as 55 miles of southeastern terrain before another working railroad could be 
reached at Rome, Georgia, northwest of Atlanta.296   It did not connect directly with Atlanta.  It 
was not used much to transport ordnance and was in bad shape by mid-1864.    
The second option meant sending cannon east by way of the Alabama River to the 
Montgomery & West Point Railroad in Montgomery.  The Montgomery and West Point traveled 
northeast, to West Point, Georgia.  Here the Montgomery and West Point became the Atlanta & 
West Point Railroad going to Atlanta.297  From Atlanta, the Georgia Railroad traveled 140 miles 
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east to Augusta, Georgia.298  This direct connection between Atlanta and Augusta was the most 
convenient route for ordnance from Selma, Alabama, to travel east. 
A longer, secondary route stretched across southern and central Georgia.  The Central of 
Georgia connected Savannah with Macon.299  This route connected Columbus with interior 
Georgia via the Southwestern Railroad.300  A spur line, in Millen, Georgia, connected this central 
Georgia railroad to Augusta.301 
 
Figure 6-1. Railroad network of the Confederate States, 1861. (Source: University of North Carolina Library). 
 
At Augusta, railroads entered South Carolina.  The South Carolina Railroad extended to 
Branchville, south of Columbia.  Another line extended to Kingville, just southeast of Columbia.  
Kingville was the southwest terminal of the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad, which ran 
through Florence and Mars Bluff.302  Rifled guns could be delivered if shipped using one of these 
paths. 
Complicating shipment using these railroads were Union army advances and assaults of 
General Sherman to the north in Tennessee.  By mid-1864, Union military movement had 
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impacted transportation on the Confederate rail system.303  Atlanta was the major railroad hub 
south of Chattanooga.  It funneled materials in all directions as far as Charleston and Savannah 
to the east and Meridian, Mississippi, to the west.  Grant ordered his chief subordinate, Gen. 
Sherman, to seize Atlanta.  Once Atlanta was taken, shipment of Confederate military resources 
would be further constricted. 
The shipment of the CSS Peedee’s Brooke guns began in July 1864.304  Com. Jones sent 
word to Lt. Augustus McLaughlin, at Columbus, of the impending transfer of guns by way of 
Montgomery. Jones believed the guns would be sent through Columbus from Montgomery by 
naval agent J. W. Parks.305  Additional communication was sent to Lt. Van R. Morgan, the Mars 
Bluff station commander, of the gun shipment.306  In the same communication to Morgan, Jones 
indicated that nobody would be sent with them and individuals commanding different stations 
responsible for shipment should be contacted if late arrival occurred.307 
The two guns did not get far before they ran into problems.  Two weeks had passed when 
Com. Jones learned the guns were in Montgomery awaiting transportation.308  Weeks later, Jones 
received word from Lt. McLaughlin that the guns had not yet reached Columbus by August 19, 
1864.309  Jones appealed directly to Com. Brooke, commander of the Office of Ordnance and 
Hydrogrophy, insisting that gun shipments would not occur “without stringent orders from 
Richmond.”310  While he waited for a directive from Richmond, Jones contacted special agent E. 
H. Jackson, responsible for gun shipments to Charleston, South Carolina.  In addition to 
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reporting the guns still in Montgomery on August 22, Jones advised Jackson to contact a Mr. 
Howell at Augusta to determine a suitable path once the guns made it to South Carolina.311  A 
few days passed until arrangements were finalized on August 29 to transport the two Brookes to 
Mars Bluff.312 Forty-eight days passed after the original shipment of the two Brooke rifles 
destined for the CSS Peedee, but the two weapons still sat in Montgomery.   
It might have been easier to ship the guns along the more northern route through Atlanta, 
but that would have risked their capture.  Gen. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign gained momentum 
as the CSS Peedee’s rifled ordnance began its path across central Alabama toward Georgia.  The 
Battle for Atlanta began in July 1864.313  By late August 1864, Atlanta was close to capitulation 
as Confederate officials prepared to destroy resources that could not be relocated before 
retreat.314  The more southern route across interior Georgia, with more stops on the way to 
Augusta, was the only valid option for the guns destined for Mars Bluff.315  As a result of Gen. 
Sherman, the two Brooke rifled cannon’s shipment path from Montgomery was sealed.   
An earlier communication between Com. Jones and Lt. McLaughlin sheds light on the 
holdup of the gun shipment from Montgomery to points east.  In his August 19 letter to Jones, 
McLaughlin, still stationed in Columbus, stated that some supplies would be “forwarded to you 
as soon as the roads are again in working order.”316  Once the guns were shipped down the 
Alabama River to Montgomery, they had one option by mid-to late August, the southerly route 
toward Columbus.  Jones admitted on August 15 that shipment of guns would be curtailed due to 
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railroad repairs; however, his specific reference to the location of those railroad repairs has not 
been ascertained.317  When compared to McLaughlin’s August 19 communication about shipping 
materials to Selma from Columbus, the most immediate railroad problems appear to lie between 
Montgomery and Columbus.   
Problems with railroad conditions were not confined to tracks between Montgomery and 
Columbus.  Railroads in central Georgia faced many obstacles maintaining reliable service.  The 
most immediate problem was Union army movements.  Union cavalry units ravaged in front of 
Sherman’s main forces near Atlanta.  Generals George Stoneman and Edward M. McCook 
caused serious problems for the Central Georgia Railroad.  The bridge over the Oconee River 
was badly damaged and no cars came into Macon from the east for nearly a month.318  The 
cavalry raids during late July help explain why the two Brooke rifles remained in Montgomery 
until August 31, when they were finally sent east.319  
While the guns were detained in Montgomery, Lt. Means took command at Mars Bluff.  
Means indicated that the guns passed through Augusta on September 8.320  Means confirmed 
their arrival in a September 27 letter sent to Jones.321  He mentioned that the guns had only been 
at Mars Bluff a few days.  Frustratingly, Means indicated that the only ammunition on hand was 
for the IX inch Dahlgren and that he still needed rifled ammunition.322  At least a month passed 
and communications continued regarding supplies for the rifled guns.  Important boxes with the 
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percussion locks and sights for the guns were lost somewhere on the road between Macon and 
Columbus.323   
The CSS Peedee’s two rifled guns took weeks traveling before installation on the 
steamer.  The guns left Selma from the Naval Gun Foundry and Ordnance Works and arrived at 
Mars Bluff.  Even after their arrival, Means found himself tracking down auxiliary supplies 
through October and November.324   
Union army movements in Georgia disrupted shipments of ordnance from central 
Alabama to points east.  The most convenient route meant shipping cannon by the Alabama 
River to Montgomery.  From Montgomery there was direct connection with Atlanta which 
extended direct lines to Augusta into South Carolina.  This route was cut before shipment 
occurred in late July and August.   
The only route available was the Southwestern Railroad through Columbus to Macon 
where it connected with the Central of Georgia.  This was the route the guns took, but Union 
cavalry raids interrupted transportation.  Repairs to the track and Oconee River Bridge kept the 
guns in Montgomery for many weeks before safe passage could be secured.  
IX-Dahlgren 
 The third heavy gun mounted on the CSS Peedee was a IX inch Dahlgren.  Initially, this 
gun was believed to have originated in Norfolk, Virginia, at the Gosport Navy Yard, captured 
after the Union evacuation in April 1861.   The Union evacuation after Virginia’s secession 
abandoned many artillery pieces, including 52 IX inch Dahlgren cannon.325  Recent 
archeological investigations indicate CSS Peedee’s Dahlgren cannon were not manufactured 
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until mid-1862.  Markings on the tube read “JMB” on the left trunnion and “FP No. 573” on the 
breech.326  These markings indicate a mid-1862 production at Fort Pitt Foundry near Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania.327  Considering this new archeological evidence, how did this Dahlgren get to 
Mars Bluff?   
 The most plausible source of this heavy smoothbore was by the Confederates capturing it.  
The date of manufacture suggests its mounting on a Union gunboat sometime during mid-to late 
1862.  Knowing the date of manufacture and that the gun had to have been obtained from a 
captured, abandoned, and or sunk Union vessel, only three options exist for the Confederates to 
obtain the weapon.  Three U.S. Navy gunboats meet the requirements: USS Eastport, USS 
Indianola, and USS Southfield.328   
USS Eastport and USS Indianola: A Trans-Mississippi Source  
The USS Eastport was built in 1862 as an ironclad steam gunboat.  It was armed with 
eight guns, including four IX inch Dahlgren guns, two rifled 60 pounder Dahlgren cannon, and 
two 100 pound Parrotts.329  The vessel first served in Tennessee as an army gunboat before 
serving in the Red River expedition in 1864.   Crew members of the CSS Missouri torpedoed the 
Eastport on April 1, 1864.  The ship was raised and towed downstream nearly 60 miles, but sunk 
again.  Many of the Eastport’s weaponry were eventually removed before it was destroyed on 
April 26, 1864.  The guns were recovered by Confederate forces the following day.330  Soon 
thereafter, two IX inch Dahlgren cannon were issued to the CSS Missouri, including one marked 
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FP No. 572.331  There is no mention of CSS Missouri’s weaponry being removed or replaced 
during the Civil War’s last year.  At the war’s end, Union officers took possession of the 
Missouri and recorded the weaponry on board.332  
The USS Indianola was another Union Army vessel built in 1862 before transfer to the 
U.S. Navy in January 1863.  This vessel’s time on the Mississippi River as a Union ship was 
short lived, as it surrendered to the Confederates in early February 1863.333  The Confederates 
destroyed it a few days later to avoid recapture.  Its armament consisted of four guns, including 
two IX inch Dahlgren cannon.334  Few specifics survive concerning the Indianola’s ordnance 
after its destruction.  There are references to the two XI inch smoothbores being disabled, but no 
documentation survives about the two IX inch Dahlgrens.  There is an outside shot that one of 
these Dahlgren’s could have made it to Mars Bluff when considering the date of the vessels’ 
sinking and the fact that this vessel is one of the three captured by Confederate forces.335 
The problem with the Eastport and Indianola as a source for the CSS Peedee Dahlgren is 
their location in the Trans-Mississippi West.  Shipping large cannon across the Mississippi River 
to Mars Bluff would have been difficult under the best of circumstances.  By the time either of 
these vessels’ armament could have been sent east, February 1863 and mid 1864, Confederate 
forces did not have adequate control over the railways and waterways connecting the Mississippi 
River with eastern parts of the Confederacy.  Vicksburg, terminus of the Meridian Railroad in 
Mississippi, was under siege by Union forces during 1863.  Even if Vicksburg had been 
accessible, and a direct connection across Mississippi to Meridian was available, Selma, 
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Alabama, was not connected by rail.  The Tombigbee River had no railroad.  If taking a similar 
path as the Brookes from Selma, which is possible, the Dahlgren cannon faced numerous stops 
along many river and rail connections across Georgia and South Carolina before reaching Mars 
Bluff.   
USS Southfield: An Eastern Source 
 A third vessel is the most plausible source of the CSS Peedee’s IX inch Dahlgren.  The 
USS Southfield was originally a New York City ferryboat before the U.S. Navy purchased it in 
December 1861.336  This vessel saw extensive action on eastern waters in Virginia and North 
Carolina.  Its last armament was added in September 1862 and included four IX inch 
Dahlgrens.337  The Southfield served until April 1864, when it was sunk by the CSS 
Albemarle.338   
 After the Southfield sank, Confederate officials made an attempt to raise it.   The attempt 
failed, but some guns were salvaged in May 1864.   After Commander J. W. Cooke raised two 
IX-inch Dahlgren cannon, he complained of having “no projectiles for them.”339  Federal spies 
substantiated Cooke’s claims and indicated one gun still on the docks while the other had been 
moved to another location.  The gun was most likely hauled upstream to another location.  Fort 
Branch was nearby, but documents and archeological investigations revealed no IX inch 
Dahlgren at the fort.340   
                                                 
336
 United States Navy Department, “Statistical Data of US Ships,” ORN ser. 2 vol. 1, 212; Silverstone, Warships, 
102.   
337
 S. P. Lee to H. K. Davenport, Oct. 24, 1862, ORN ser. 1 vol. 8, 146-147.  
338
 Barrett, Civil War in North Carolina, 217-218. 
339
 Ed. John M. Brooke, Jr. Ironclads and Big Guns of the Confederacy: The Journal and Letters of John M. Brooke 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2002), 184; Cooke to Brooke, May 16, 1864, ORN ser. 1 vol. 10, 640-
641. 
340
 Phillip Shiman, Fort Branch and the Defense of the Roanoke Valley 1862-1865 (Hamilton, NC, Fort Branch 
Battlefield Commission, 1990), 51; Babits, “Confederate Artillery Material,” 25-26. 
  
103 
 
 With Fort Branch eliminated, the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad loomed as the other 
possible destination.  Traveling by ship upriver to Weldon, North Carolina, the gun could have 
been loaded onto the railroad and taken south to Wilmington.  In Wilmington, the cannon could 
have been transferred to the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad that traveled to Mars Bluff.   
Recovering the cannon from the Southfield in May 1864 gives Confederate authorities plenty of 
time, if traveling by rail, to get this particular Dahlgren to Mars Bluff by September 1864.341  
The only problem with this particular Dahlgren source is when the Southfield was armed in the 
fall 1862.  FP 573 was a mid-summer manufacture and it is possible that the gun went elsewhere.  
No primary source, log book, or communication has been located verifying the cannon serial 
number on the USS Southfield.   
Conclusion 
Obtaining ordnance for Confederate gunboats was arguably the most important and 
difficult job of naval constructors and officers after construction.   For the CSS Peedee, these 
difficulties were clear.   
Two Brooke rifles were manufactured at the Naval Gun Foundry and Ordnance Works in 
Selma, Alabama.  After production, the two rifles made their difficult journey across Alabama, 
Georgia, and South Carolina.  Union military movements, especially those associated with 
Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, caused delay and uncertainty. Union movements not only cut 
major railroads in Atlanta but also caused destruction along routes east of Macon.  These 
railways were the most direct routes to Mars Bluff.  By mid-1864, other railways used along the 
journey were in poor shape, even those in close proximity to Selma and Columbus.  
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The IX inch Dahlgren cannon destined for CSS Peedee possibly had a more direct route 
to Mars Bluff.  Archeological investigations in 2009 shed light on the original source of the 
Dahlgren.  Instead of coming from the stockpile abandoned by retreating Union forces at 
Norfolk, foundry markings “FP 573” on the cannon’s side clearly indicate a mid 1862 northern 
manufacture at Fort Pitt Foundry.     
Three Union vessels are possible sources for the IX-inch Dahlgren, USS Eastport, USS 
Indianola, and USS Southfield.  These are the only vessels from which Confederate States Navy 
forces recovered cannon post July 1, 1862.  The first two vessels served in the Trans-Mississippi 
west and faced a near impossible journey through Union controlled terrain.  The third vessel, the 
Southfield, is the most likely source of the Dahlgren having served in waters along the Virginia 
and North Carolina coast that had access to working railroad communities reaching Mars Bluff.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 The Confederate States Navy faced difficult challenges building warships.  Despite the 
difficulties, Stephen Mallory charted an ambitious course upon his appointment as Confederate 
Navy Secretary.  One top priority was ironclads.  Mallory preferred to use technological 
innovation to combat superior United States Navy numbers.  Despite a preference for ironclads, 
wooden gunboats were built throughout the war; however, after the Battle of Hampton Roads, 
wooden gunboat construction was placed in a secondary position.   
 Mallory’s dreams of an ironclad fleet were placed upon the back of an agriculturally 
based economy with limited industrial and manufacturing resources. Wartime conditions choked 
a fragile logistical framework.  That logistical infrastructure was dependent upon limited track 
mileage, unsecured rivers, and an over-reliance upon bulk imports.  Once the Union blockade 
became effective, constriction of an underdeveloped wartime economy occurred.  Wooden 
gunboat construction experienced many of the same difficulties ironclads faced, due to a shared 
reliance upon the limited infrastructure.    
 During both phases of Confederate States Navy construction, wooden gunboats were 
contracted for and built.  During the Civil War’s first year, the uncertainty of a foreign or 
domestically manufactured Confederate ironclad, created a greater need for wooden gunboats.  
With armor technology still in its infancy, some Confederates, formerly leaders in the United 
States Navy, advocated wooden gunboat construction as a cheaper, more reliable way of 
constructing a navy.  Proponents, including Commander Matthew Fontaine Maury, viewed 
ironclad technology as a waste of resources and money.  When considering overall Confederate 
potential to manufacture and repair ironclads, Maury viewed the newer weapons with caution.  
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Despite Mallory’s enthusiasm for ironclads, wooden gunboats were a major part of Confederate 
shipbuilding strategy early in the war. 
The Battle of Hampton Roads helped signal the end of the first phase of Confederate 
shipbuilding activities.  The duel of the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor meant elimination of 
widespread wooden gunboat construction.  The technological innovation displayed in combat 
with the loss of Memphis, New Orleans, and Norfolk meant a reorganized and refocused 
Confederate shipbuilding program.  Mallory embraced the newer technology and the fact that 
only a limited number of ships could be built.  The few ships he sought would not be just 
warships, but technologically superior, incorporating iron plates and the newest artillery.  That 
newer focus still had to contend with limited infrastructure and manufacturing ability, 
questionable transportation, and a lack of suitable labor to keep operating at peak capacity.   
 The Confederate strategy for shipbuilding, advocated by Confederate Navy Secretary 
Stephen Mallory, focused upon ironclad construction.  Despite the hopes, and then the 
demonstrated effectiveness of the ironclad, Mallory’s department still built wooden gunboats 
during each phase of Confederate shipbuilding operations.  Northeastern North Carolina, during 
the war’s first year, and the Mars Bluff Navy Yard after Confederate reorganization, both 
became areas for Confederate wooden gunboat construction.   
 In northeastern North Carolina, the inland ports of Washington and Elizabeth City were 
selected as shipbuilding sites in the fall of 1861.  Seven wooden gunboats were contracted 
between private companies and the Confederate government.  The naval constructors, carpenters, 
and local businesses did not have enough time to finish the gunboats.  Problems securing enough 
building materials doomed Gilbert Elliott’s construction efforts.  Finding suitable marine engines 
proved difficult for the young naval agent.  Myers & Company and Ritch and Farrow entered 
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similar contracts to build wooden gunboats.  Although it appears considerable progress was 
made, problems securing engines and ordnance prevented completion.  Despite securing 
agreements with the Shockoe Foundry in Richmond, limited materials and the Burnside 
Expedition prevented the wooden steamers being finished.  The seven vessels may have been 
completed given enough time; however, an ever changing frontier caused by Union military 
movements consistently upset shipbuilding operations and ended many during the spring of 
1862.   
 Construction of the wooden gunboat CSS Peedee at Mars Bluff represented the 
reorganized Navy Department’s effort to build gunboats in the interior.  Although the 
Confederate States Navy focused on ironclads after 1862, the Mars Bluff Navy Yard built a 
wooden gunboat.  Similar to problems experienced in northeastern North Carolina, Confederate 
officers and laborers were still reliant upon other areas of the Confederacy for key materials.  
Successful completion of the CSS Peedee can be attributed to access Mars Bluff had with other 
cities via direct rail connections provided by the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad.  Cannon, 
machinery, gun carriages, and building materials were shipped by rail.   
 Mars Bluff’s position on the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad did afford some 
opportunities not experienced by builders in northeastern North Carolina.  Despite its placement 
near a railroad, circumstances in other parts of the Confederacy curtailed construction efforts 
locally.  Finding suitable steam machinery and other parts was difficult, especially when 
alterations had to be made.  Ordnance production was limited to Richmond and Selma during 
CSS Peedee’s construction.  The rifled ordnance destined for Mars Bluff was produced in 
Alabama.  Material shortages, securing skilled labor, and problems maintaining safe and efficient 
shipment of the Brooke rifles held back delivery.  Considering the difficult military situation 
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facing the Confederacy during the war’s final year, obtaining supplies needed to run Mars Bluff 
became more difficult.  The logistical limitations coupled with Mallory’s preference for ironclad 
vessels increased the time needed to complete CSS Peedee.   
Wooden gunboat construction occurred during both phases of Confederate shipbuilding 
operations.  The wooden gunboat program, occurring alongside the more important ironclad 
program, experienced many of the same logistical shortcomings despite design and material 
differences.  Confederate deficiencies in domestic ordnance and ship machinery manufacture, 
coupled with an inadequate railroad and transportation network caused problems with wooden 
gunboat construction.  Commander Sinclair, with the help of Myers & Company and Ritch and 
Farrow in Washington, and Gilbert Elliott’s efforts in Elizabeth City represented the difficulties 
wooden gunboat construction experienced during the war’s first year.  After Confederate 
reorganization, CSS Peedee was successfully completed, yet experienced many problems during 
its building, taking nearly two years to become operable.     
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